

UBER'S LICENSE TO KILL INSURANCE SCAM

HOW UBER IS LIMITING ITS LIABILITY TO RAID
ITS INSURANCE RESERVES & FUND ROBOTAXIS



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Consumer Watchdog wishes to acknowledge the help of Dylan Dordick and Chris Dolan in the preparation of this report.

Report Findings

- Uber has committed \$10 billion to purchasing robotaxis, according to recent [reporting](#) from the *Financial Times*, as it has socked away \$12 billion via a complex, dark money insurance structure that allows it to hoard billions in self-funded insurance reserves. The company's goal appears to be to strictly limit its own liability for car crashes, via tort reform efforts nationwide, so that it can use the reserves to finance a dangerous robocar future, instead of paying people injured, hurt or killed by its drivers and operations.
- While Uber claims its insurance premiums are excessive, the company self-funds 95% of its risk. Toward that end, Uber executives formed a captive insurer in Hawaii—Aleka Insurance Inc. Aleka is run by Uber executives, and is a wholly-owned Uber subsidiary exclusively handling Uber's self-insurance. Uber has accumulated \$12.46 billion in insurance reserves in 2025, a 27% increase from the \$9.8 billion in reserves in 2024, and nearly doubling its \$6.7 billion reserves in 2023. By internalizing over 95% of its insurance risk, Uber maintains control over premium flows generated from rides, rather than relying on traditional third-party insurers. Since the money is reserved for claims payout, it is not taxed as profits would be.
- Aleka Insurance's entire board and executive committee are or have been executives at the parent company Uber. Since Aleka is a privately-held, wholly owned subsidiary, Uber is under no obligation to disclose any information on the company's finances and can instead fold Aleka's financials into their own—allowing Uber executives to obfuscate what would otherwise be public information.
- Uber's legislative and ballot measure efforts, such as lowering mandated insurance coverage requirements in California and restricting legal recovery in states across America, will decrease the amount paid out to victims, allowing excess reserves to accumulate. These retained funds can be redirected toward Uber's \$10 billion robotaxi expansion and be accounted for as costs in the year they are spent, rather than profits in the year the dollars were made—creating a tax shelter for the company. That cash could be taxed in a year when Uber made a big investment and would have less profit to tax.
- Uber's top public policy executive misrepresented the companies' insurance structure to the California legislature in 2025 when securing a reduction in uninsured motorists premium coverage through SB 371. "In LA County, 45% of every fare is a straight pass-through to government-mandated insurance," said Romona Prieto, Uber's head of public policy told the [Assembly Standing Committee on Communications and Conveyance](#) on July 16, 2025. In fact, the company was paying itself for insurance and at a rate that it set and allowed its reserves to grow by nearly 50% from 2023 to 2025. In other words, Uber appears to be overcharging itself for insurance premiums that it

claimed was bleeding its riders dry in order to secure a reprieve from a state legislative mandate.

- Uber’s investment in a 2026 California ballot measure restricting victims’ medical recovery and access to contingency fee attorneys will allow it to free itself from liability and open up its “piggy bank” of insurance reserves for investing in its rollout of robotaxis. Those robotaxis, freed from full liability for injuries or death, could give Uber a “license to kill.”
- Uber’s record with robotaxis is disastrous, as outlined in Consumer Watchdog’s previous report [“License To Kill: How Uber’s Rush To Close the Courthouse Doors and Roll Out Robocars Threatens Public Safety.”](#) Uber’s robocar rollout in Arizona was the first and only known instance of a robocar killing a human being. Uber has failed to test its robocars to the degree that Waymo has, and its cars are more cheaply made with fewer sensors. There can be no more dangerous a situation than giving a company whose philosophy is “move fast and break things” the keys to \$10 billion worth of robocars with little liability or legal accountability for the injuries they cause attached.

A Big Bet

Uber's push to reduce insurance liability and legal access in California and nationwide comes as it has been quietly growing \$12.46 billion in self-funded insurance money, according to financial documents and regulatory filings obtained by Consumer Watchdog. This creates an opportunity to allow the company to unlock capital and finance its big robotaxi expansion if its liability is reduced by various public policy changes it is promoting across the nation and in California.

Uber's insurance reserves have grown by 27% from 2024 to 2025, from \$9.8 billion to \$12.46 billion, and nearly doubling its \$6.7 billion reserves, according to its [2023 annual report](#). (Pg. 74)

	2024	2025
Liabilities, redeemable non-controlling interests and equity		
Accounts payable	\$ 858	\$ 1,013
Short-term insurance reserves	2,754	3,387
Operating lease liabilities, current	175	169
Accrued and other current liabilities	7,689	7,751
Total current liabilities	11,476	12,320
Long-term insurance reserves	7,042	9,076
Long-term debt, net of current portion	8,347	10,521
Operating lease liabilities, non-current	1,454	1,390
Other long-term liabilities	449	412
Total liabilities	28,768	33,719

- TOTAL INSURANCE RESERVES 2024=9,796,000,000
- TOTAL INSURANCE RESERVES 2025=12,463,000,000 (Up 27%.) ([Annual Report P. 73](#))

The accumulation of a significant insurance reserve creates tax advantages for the company. The principal in the insurance reserve is not taxed as profit because it is set aside as a liability. (IRC 846: 26 U.S.C.A. § 846, I.R.C. § 846) If the company can reduce its liability through new public policy initiatives such as its California ballot measure, and convert the funds into unrestricted cash, it would free up significant capital to invest in its robotaxi rollout. Moreover, that cash could be taxed in a year when Uber made a big investment and would have less profit to tax.

In its annual report, Uber states its need for financing its robotaxis.

“If we fail to offer autonomous vehicle technologies on our platform at competitive scale or fail to offer such technologies or scale on our platform before our competitors, or if such technologies fail to perform as expected, are inferior to those offered by our competitors, or are perceived as less safe than those offered by competitors or non-autonomous vehicles, our financial performance and prospects would be adversely impacted.”

“In particular, we may need to incur additional debt to finance the purchase of autonomous vehicles or infrastructure to support autonomous vehicles, and such financing may not be available to us on attractive terms or at all. (P. 30)

“In July 2025, we agreed to purchase, or have our designated fleet operators purchase, a minimum of 20,000 Lucid vehicles equipped with Nuro’s Level 4 autonomous driving systems over a six-year period following the start of production, which is targeted for 2026.” (P. 63)

Through equity stakes and partnerships, Uber is investing roughly \$10 billion in robotaxis, according to the *Financial Times*. It has [committed \\$300 million](#) to purchase 20,000 Lucid-Gravity AVs over a 6-year period, and \$250 million into robocar company Waabi for [25,000 robocars](#). Uber also said it will invest over \$1 billion in Rivian to deploy its robotaxis [beginning in 2028](#).

Overall, Uber has partnered with over 20 car companies and self-driving companies and wants to offer rides in 15 cities by the end of 2026, including San Francisco and Los Angeles. By the end of the decade, it wants to be the main facilitator of rides.



An Uber Lucid robotaxi. (Lucid)

Uber's Hidden War Chest

Uber doesn't just carry traditional insurance like many corporate entities. It carries mobility insurance in order to meet state requirements, but less than 5% of reserves are held by third-parties like AIG, according to the company's [2025 filings](#) with the Securities & Exchange Commission.

“\$264 million and \$473 million of the insurance reserve is covered by third-party insurance,” [according to an Uber 10-K filing](#). (P.122)

And according to documents obtained by Consumer Watchdog, Uber executives formed what is called a captive insurance company—Aleka Insurance Inc.—which currently holds over 95% of the risk. Incorporating in Hawaii allows Uber to assert more control and work within a more pro-corporate tax structure. It raises questions about corporate transparency and the motivations hiding behind the company's moves at tort reform.

In 2021, Uber's underwriter at the time, James River, [ceded about \\$345.1 million](#) of commercial auto liabilities relating to business written for Uber's ride-sharing business between 2013-2019. It marks the moment Uber began internalizing its insurance risk, routing premiums through Aleka.

Now excess reserves could accumulate due to relatively low claim payouts, while reinsurance structures allow Uber to present the appearance of third-party risk transfer without relinquishing control of the underlying capital. (See [James River Loss Portfolio Transfer](#))

Uber executives formed what is called a captive insurance company.



How the Scheme Works

Start with something Uber will never say out loud: It's really an insurance company, but one that only serves itself.

Uber's captive insurance structure allows Uber to do this by not paying premiums to an outside carrier.

Every ride generates insurance premiums baked into the fare. Instead of those premiums flowing primarily to outside insurers, they accumulate inside Uber's captive structure. Because Aleka holds the majority of the risk, Uber retains control over a growing pool of capital, money that is supposed to be reserved for future claims but does not immediately leave the company's financial orbit.

*These efforts
will have real
world
consequences for
the victims of all
motor vehicle
accidents—
not just Uber
accidents.*

If claims are lower because of stricter legal standards or reduced coverage requirements, less of that reserve is depleted. Over time, that can create a gap between what is set aside and what is actually needed to pay claims. Uber would be able to recategorize reserves as unrestricted cash to invest in robotaxis.

Uber's public policy efforts to reduce its liabilities in California, Florida, Indiana, Nevada and New York appear to be an attempt to move those reserves into unrestricted cash on its balance sheet and invest in robotaxis.

These efforts will have real world consequences for the victims of all motor vehicle accidents—not just Uber accidents.

For example, Uber's proposed ballot measure in California would impose such strict limits on accident victims' medical recovery and rights to contingency fee representation that it has been described this way:

Erwin Chemerinsky dean and professor of law at the UC Berkeley School of Law [wrote](#): "Uber has submitted a ballot initiative that would help the company at the expense of the rest of us... Automobile accident victims are the losers if they can't get to court; the winners are businesses like Uber and insurance companies that will be able to avoid liability more often despite being at fault... Without legal representation, accident victims would more often receive little or no recovery. Uber's interest, of course, is not really about helping automobile accident victims—no one should think that for an instant. Quite the contrary, Uber wants to make it harder for those injured in its vehicles to have their day in court and recover."

Pulitzer Prize-winning *Los Angeles Times* business columnist [Mike Hiltzik](#): “Uber is trying to snow voters with a supposedly pro-consumer ballot measure. Don’t buy it... Capping contingency fees makes many lawsuits uneconomical for attorneys, who must shoulder litigation costs such as expert testimony until a final judgment is achieved, and are left holding the bag if there is no recovery or the judgment doesn’t cover their costs. So this initiative, if passed, almost inevitably would reduce the tide of lawsuits filed against Uber. Indeed, what gives this effort the stench of cynicism and hypocrisy is that we have plenty of experience about what happens when contingency fees are capped: Plaintiffs who have suffered grievous injury (or if they’ve died, their survivors) have trouble even getting through the courtroom door.”

The irony is that while Uber claims it was driven to the ballot box and legislature by unscrupulous billboard attorneys and frivolous lawsuits that are driving up its insurance rates, there is no mention in its annual report of this being the source of increasing insurance expenses. In the section of the report discussing increasing insurance rates per mile and mile driven there is no reference to frivolous or inflated claims, any increase in claims, or any fraudulent conduct by lawyers or lien providers being a source of an increase in insurance costs—it is based on number of miles driven and cost per mile. (P.57)

The annual report is quite revealing about Uber’s self-serving business strategy, one that is aided by limited liability.

One of the reasons cited for Uber’s push to limit liability is its failure to do appropriate and comprehensive background checks of its drivers. This has led to deaths and injuries caused by drivers with DUIs and other safety issues getting Uber status. In addition, the tens of thousands of sexual assaults reported in Ubers stems from a failure of Uber do adequate background checks. In its annual report, Uber cites the impact of having to do more expensive and better background checks on its operations:

“If we are unable to attract or maintain a sufficient number of Drivers, consumers, merchants, Shippers, and Carriers, whether as a result of competition or other factors, our platform will become less appealing to platform users, and our financial results would be adversely impacted.” (P. 10)

“In addition, changes in Driver qualification and background-check requirements *may increase our costs and reduce our ability to onboard additional Drivers to our platform.*” (Emphasis added, P.15)

*Uber’s stock
price has fallen
by more than
30% since the
filing of its ballot
measure in
October.*

“Legislators and regulators may pass laws or adopt regulations in the future requiring Drivers to undergo a materially different type of qualification, screening, or background check process, or that limit our ability to access information used in the background check process in an efficient manner, which could be costly and time-consuming. Required changes in the qualification, screening, and background check process (including any changes to such processes of Careem, Postmates or other acquired companies) could also reduce the number of Drivers in those markets or extend the time required to recruit new Drivers to our platform, which would adversely impact our business and growth..... The failure of this provider to provide background checks on a timely basis would result in our inability to onboard new Drivers or retain existing Drivers undergoing periodic background checks that are required to continue using our platform.” (P.15)

In other words, Uber’s resistance to better background checks is based on cost and its ability to field enough drivers. Its push for limited liability will allow it to continue its failed background check system as it transitions to a robotaxi future that could be even more dangerous for consumers.

However, Uber’s California ballot measure has prompted a countermeasure requiring strict background checks for Uber drivers and Uber’s strict liability for sexual assaults that occur in Ubers. Both ballot measures appear likely to qualify for the November 2026 ballot. In addition, Uber’s epidemic of sexual assaults has been the subject of multiple *New York Times* investigative articles, highlighting the counter measure for the public and shareholders. Not surprisingly, Uber’s stock price has fallen by more than 30% since the filing of its ballot measure in October. Meanwhile, Uber’s CEO Dara Khosrowshahi was compensated nearly \$36 million in 2025.

Uber Misled California Legislature And Unions

During the 2025 California legislative session, Uber leveraged its political power for a change in the uninsured motorist coverage it must buy under state law. Now, if you are a Californian hit by an uninsured motorist while in an Uber, Uber no longer has to have coverage for \$1 million in damages, but \$60,000 per person and \$300,000 per accident. For seriously injured consumers that's a big problem.

Uber argued that the change would cut its insurance cost.

“In LA County, 45% of every fare is a straight pass-through to government-mandated insurance,” said Romona Prieto, Uber’s head of public policy. “Let's use a trip to LAX and let's use a round number. It's \$100 and you or I individually are deciding if we can afford to do that. \$45 of that \$100 today goes to government mandated insurance.”

What Uber didn't tell the legislature is that Uber wasn't paying for 95% of its insurance. Uber was paying itself and over-reserving.

Uber's 2025 revenue was \$52 billion, up from 2024, according to financial disclosures. Its \$12.5 billion self-funded insurance reserve, which grew by nearly 50% from 2023, appears to be a giant “piggy bank.”

Uber may well have reason to want to over-reserve, given its safety history, but the fact is by setting its own reserve amount it is setting the price of its own insurance premiums. The vast majority of those premiums are set by Aleka.

Filings from Hawaii show Aleka Insurance's board has five directors, all of whom are current or former Uber executives. Carolyn Mo is Uber's Senior Director and Assistant Corporate Secretary since February 2014. Glen David Ceremony is Uber's Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer and Global Corporate Controller. Andy Parr is Uber's Vice President of Insurance. Henry Gus Fuldner left Uber on March 10, 2026 to be Global Head of Operations for Airbnb. He was Senior VP of Core Services and had been with Uber since 2013.



Aleka Insurance's corporate headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS
 BUSINESS REGISTRATION DIVISION
 335 Merchant Street
 Mailing Address: Annual Filing, P.O. Box 40, Honolulu, HI 96810

DOMESTIC PROFIT CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT AS OF January 1, 2026

CORPORATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS

✓ ALEKA INSURANCE, INC.
 1003 BISHOP STREET
 SUITE 2700
 HONOLULU HI 96813

Principal Office Address

✓ 1003 BISHOP STREET
 SUITE 2700
 HONOLULU HI 96813

1. AUTHORIZED SHARES

CLASS	NUMBER
COMMON	100,000,000

TOTAL NUMBER OF SHARES ISSUED

CLASS	NUMBER
COMMON	250,000

2. Nature of Business

CAPTIVE INSURANCE ENTITY

3. The name of the registered agent and the registered agent's street address of the place of business in Hawaii of the person to which service of process and other notice and documents being served on or sent to the entity represented by it may be delivered to.

CHRISTINA KAMAKA
 1001 BISHOP STREET, SUITE 2855
 HONOLULU HI 96813

Mo is Uber's Senior Director and Assistant Corporate Secretary since February 2016. Background in corporate law and investment banking

Ceremony is Uber's Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer, and Global Corporate Controller. Joined Uber in 2018. Background is corporate CFO.

4. List all officers and directors.

Offices Held	Full Name	Address
S/D	MO, CAROLYN	1003 BISHOP STREET, SUITE 2700, HONOLULU HI 96813
T/D	CEREMONY, GLEN DAVID	1003 BISHOP STREET, SUITE 2700, HONOLULU HI 96813
P/D	PARR, ANDY	1003 BISHOP STREET, SUITE 2700, HONOLULU HI 96813
P/D	FULDNER, HENRY GUS	1003 BISHOP STREET, SUITE 2700, HONOLULU HI 96813

01/07/202644811

NO CHANGES
 Checking this box means there are no changes reported. The Department will not be held responsible for any changes made to this report.

Parr is Uber's Vice President of Insurance.

CERTIFICATION

I certify under the penalties of Section 414-20, Hawaii Revised Statutes, that I have read the above, the information is true and correct, and I am authorized to sign this report.

January 7, 2026	LARS FOX	LARS FOX
Date	Signature of authorized officer, attorney-in-fact for an officer, or receiver or trustee (if the corporation is in the hands of a receiver or trustee)	Print Name

FILE NO. 242297 D1
 Rev. 10/2013




Fuldner left Uber on March 10, 2026 to be Global Head of Operations for Airbnb. It looks like he may have been one of the masterminds of Aleka. He was with Uber since 2013 rising to Senior VP of Core Services. Background is financial services and built their first insurance programs.

2026 B17
 B22
 B34



The articles of incorporation for Aleka Insurance lists their officers and directors—all are current or recent Uber executives.



STATE OF HAWAII
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS
Business Registration Division
335 Merchant Street
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 40, Honolulu, Hawaii 96810
Phone No. (808) 586-2727

OFFICER / DIRECTOR / MEMBER / MANAGER CHANGES

PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT LEGIBLY IN BLACK INK

Re: ALEKA INSURANCE, INC.
(Name of Entity)

To Whom It May Concern:

These are the current officers/directors/members/managers for the above named entity:

Name: <u>FULDNER, HENRY "GUS"</u>	Title: <u>President, Director</u>
Address: <u>1725 3RD STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94158 USA</u>	
Name: <u>CEREMONY, GLEN DAVID</u>	Title: <u>Treasurer, Director</u>
Address: <u>1725 3RD STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94158 USA</u>	
Name: <u>MO, CAROLYN</u>	Title: <u>Secretary, Director</u>
Address: <u>1725 3RD STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94158 USA</u>	
Name: <u>PARR, ANDY</u>	Title: <u>Vice President, Director</u>
Address: <u>1725 3RD STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94158 USA</u>	

07/05/2024 11:24 AM

I certify under the penalties of the Hawaii Revised Statutes that I am authorized to make this change for the entity and the statements herein are true and correct in all material respects.

Signed this 05 day of JULY 2024

Sincerely,

CAROLYN MO
(Signature)

CAROLYN MO, SECRETARY
(Print Name & Title)

FILE #: 242297D1

To get the Sacramento change done in record time, Uber also offered the carrot of allowing its drivers to unionize as a way of inducing union-backed Democrats into rushing through SB 371 within the last weeks of session. The companion bill, AB 1340, allowing ride share employees to unionize, moved through the legislature, as soon as the deal on SB 371 was done. SEIU, the union behind AB 1340, supported the lobbying effort, which is why SB 371 didn't have a single "no" vote.

Days after Governor Newsom signed SB 371 into law, Uber filed its ballot to limit accident victims' rights to medical recovery and contingency fee attorneys. A few weeks later, Uber announced a deal to bring 20,000 robot taxis to dozens of markets all over the world over the next six years, which would displace drivers and the need to unionize them.

Uber misrepresented its insurance payment system to the legislature and its intent for a unionized workforce to labor unions. Can Uber be trusted?



Uber-generated image promising lower rates from SB 371. Days after the legislation was signed into law, Uber filed a ballot measure to take away more rights from accident victims. (Uber)

What's at Stake

What's at stake isn't really about insurance. It's about what happens after a motor vehicle crash.

Right now, if an Uber driver, or eventually one of its robotaxis, hits and injures someone, there is at least a system in place that is aimed to force accountability. People can sue. They can recover medical costs. They can hire a lawyer and try to prove what went wrong.

But Uber is trying to change that. Across California and a growing list of states, the company is backing laws and sponsoring ballot measures that would narrow what victims can recover and, in some cases, how they can even bring a case at all.

The reality is people do get hurt. Passengers, pedestrians, other drivers. [As we laid out in a recent report](#), many Uber cases involve drivers who had prior criminal or traffic records but were still approved to drive on the platform.

The impact of Uber's California ballot measure on people injured in a motor vehicle accident is profound:

Medical Cost Caps Limit Access To Care: The California proposal would also cap recoverable medical expenses at levels tied closely to Medicare reimbursement rates. These limits could prevent accidents victims from getting care and healthcare providers from treating crash victims because the capped reimbursements would not cover the actual cost of care.

Proposed CA Law Would Block Seriously Injured Victims From Finding Lawyers: Under Uber's proposed California law, seriously injured accident victims would not be able to get contingency lawyers because the proposal makes it economically unviable for an attorney to take a case on a contingency basis. The proposal requires that, for the purposes of an attorney fees contract, medical expenses and contingency fees come out of the same 25% pot that attorneys would receive. If, for example, medical expenses total more than \$250,000 on a \$1 million accident policy, the attorney would receive nothing.

Product Liability Cases Would Be Eviscerated: The initiative would also apply to product defect claims related to vehicle crashes. This would make it significantly harder to pursue cases involving defective airbags, braking systems, steering failures, battery problems, or faulty software. Such lawsuits have historically played a critical role in forcing manufacturers to improve vehicle safety. Weakening these legal tools would reduce incentives for companies to address dangerous defects, including those in autonomous driving systems.

Liability Limits Will Normalize Robotaxis Before They Are Ready For The

Road: Uber has announced plans to deploy up to 20,000 robotaxis in partnership with autonomous vehicle developer Nuro over the next six years. However, its partner Nuro’s testing record in California lags far behind competitors. Nuro could not go 700 miles without a human intervention when Waymo could go nearly 20,000 miles. In 2025, Nuro vehicles reportedly logged fewer than 160,000 autonomous miles in California, compared with more than 3 million miles driven by Waymo. The Nuro cars are cheaply made and without the sensor capacity of Waymo’s. Experts interviewed by Consumer Watchdog say little is publicly known about Uber’s testing protocols, safety standards, or vehicle specifications. “There are a lot of unknowns,” said Bryant Walker-Smith, an associate professor in the School of Law and the College of Engineering and Computing at the University of South Carolina, in January. “Uber is running a prototype that it started testing last month. We don’t know what safety standards, if any, Uber is adhering to. We don’t know the specs of the car. We don’t know about their internal testing. We don’t know cost of production.” At recent Senate hearings, lawmakers also raised concerns about autonomous vehicles being monitored by remote operators overseas, so-called “trans-Atlantic backseat drivers,” who are not covered by existing regulatory frameworks.

Uber’s attempt to strictly limit its liability in crashes, free its insurance reserves to fund its robotaxis, and avoid liability for the safety impact of its robotaxi rollout is a strategy that lurks behind its tort reform proposals in California and multiple states.