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BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Rate Applications of

State Farm General Insurance
Company,

Applicant.

File Nos.: PA-2024-00011, PA-2024-00012,
PA-2024-00013

**CONSUMER WATCHDOG'S POST-
HEARING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
CDI AND STATE FARM GENERAL'S
TWO-WAY STIPULATION TO INTERIM
RATE**

Interim Rate Hearing: April 8–10, 2025

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1 **I. Introduction and Summary of Argument**

2 State Farm General Insurance Company¹ (“State Farm”) and the California Department of
3 Insurance (“CDI” or “Department”) have asked the Administrative Law Judge to recommend approval
4 of “interim rate” hikes—not based on the legally required actuarial analysis, but based on generalized
5 concerns about the insurance market as a whole and speculation about future downgrades to State
6 Farm’s credit ratings.

7 No witness for either State Farm or the Department has testified that State Farm’s current rates
8 are inadequate under the regulatory ratemaking formula. Nor has any witness claimed that the proposed
9 17% increase is actuarially justified. The sole Department witness—and sole actuary testifying in support
10 of the stipulation—admitted that she had performed no calculations to determine if State Farm’s current
11 rates or any number below 17% would be inadequate or to determine if the proposed 17% homeowners
12 interim rate hike is actuarially sound or complies with the prior approval rate regulations.² She freely
13 admitted that that number was “given to [her] by [her] counsel”³ and admitted that more support from
14 the parent would obviously be helpful with less impact to consumers.⁴ Likewise, State Farm’s two
15 witnesses offered no actuarial analysis, opinion about whether current rates were invalid, or actuarial
16 support for the “numbers”—the same 17% that was just given to the CDI’s witness.

17 Indeed, State Farm concedes its ability to fully pay existing claims in the wake of the January
18 2025 Los Angeles fires is “not in question” because, according to its Treasurer and Chief Financial
19 Officer, under its “very robust re-insurance program,” its parent company State Farm Mutual and other
20 affiliated and nonaffiliated reinsurers will assume \$7.7 billion of its estimated \$7.9 billion in losses from
21 those fires.⁵

22 The legal question before the Administrative Law Judge at this juncture is narrow: has State
23 Farm met its evidentiary burden of showing that it is entitled to approval of interim rates under the sole
24 legal standard articulated by the California Supreme Court? The answer is clearly no.

25 _____
26 ¹ All subsequent references to “State Farm” are to “State Farm General Insurance Company” unless
otherwise indicated.

27 ² Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 48:2–7, 45:10–13.

28 ³ *Id.* at 45:24–25.

⁴ *Id.* at 101:14–18.

⁵ IRH-SFG-180 [Feb. 26, 2025 Transcript] at 15:20–16:9.

1 **The proposed stipulation does not pass the *Calfarm* test.** Under *Calfarm Insurance Co. v.*
2 *Deukmejian* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 824, the Court held that the Commissioner has the power “to grant
3 interim relief *from plainly invalid rates*.” (Emphasis added.) That power, the Court explained, is implied
4 from the statutory command of Insurance Code section 1861.05, subdivision (a): “No rate shall be
5 approved or remain in effect which is excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in
6 violation of this chapter.” Thus absent a showing that an insurer’s rates currently in effect are excessive,
7 inadequate, or otherwise illegal, there are no “plainly invalid rates” from which interim relief would be
8 warranted.

9 Two months ago, the Commissioner cited this very legal standard from *Calfarm* when he denied
10 State Farm’s initial request for interim rate relief,⁶ at which time he stated: “State Farm has not met its
11 burden.”⁷ Two attempts at stipulations, and after a three-day evidentiary hearing, nothing has changed.
12 The rate templates State Farm provided in support of its interim rate requests confirm that its current
13 rates for its homeowners, renters, and condo owners lines of insurance fall within State Farm’s own
14 calculations of the maximum and minimum permitted earned premium and thus are not excessive or
15 inadequate under the standard regulatory ratemaking formula,⁸ and no State Farm or Department witness
16 has claimed that interim rate relief is needed due to its current rates being inadequate or otherwise
17 confiscatory.

18 State Farm’s alleged “deteriorating” or “precarious” financial condition, largely a result of State
19 Farm’s own strategic decisions to not seek the full rate increases it claimed it needed from 2017–2023,
20 does not provide legal justification for extraordinary interim rate relief under the standard set forth in
21 *Calfarm*. Nor does a generalized concern about “the overall health of the California homeowners
22 insurance marketplace.”⁹ And neither the Department nor State Farm have cited any other legal standard
23 set forth in any statute, caselaw, or regulation that permits interim rate relief—or even advocated for a
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26 ⁶ IRG-SFG-149-03 (stating “the Commissioner has the authority to grant interim relief from plainly
27 invalid rates,” citing *20th Century Insurance Company v. Garamendi* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 245 and
28 *Calfarm, supra*, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 824–25).

⁷ IRG-SFG-149-02.

⁸ IRH-SFG-136-04 [non-tenant homeowners], IRH-SFG 138-05 [renters], and 138-06 [condo owners].

⁹ IRH-CDI-001 [Shaw Decl.], ¶ 3, lines 11–13.

1 new workable legal standard to evaluate interim rate relief requests, if they believe *Calfarm* should be
2 limited or overturned. Thus, there is no legal basis to grant emergency interim rate relief, and the
3 stipulation must be rejected on this ground alone.

4 **The proposed stipulation does not pass regulatory standards.** The proposed stipulation fails
5 both to meet the requisite legal standard for interim rate relief and the regulatory standards for approval
6 of settlements by stipulation. Under California Code of Regulations, title 10 (“10 CCR”), section
7 2656.2, “the administrative law judge shall reject a proposed stipulation or settlement whenever, in the
8 administrative law judge’s judgment, the stipulation or settlement is not in the public interest and is not,
9 taken as a whole, fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Though the stipulation states that “the
10 Department believes and thereon alleges [the] Stipulation is in the public interest, in order to maintain
11 maximum availability of homeowners insurance options in California,”¹⁰ its sole witness did not
12 articulate in her sworn declaration, in her testimony, or on cross examination how raising State Farm’s
13 homeowners rates 17% on average (with some policyholders with higher risk properties paying even
14 more) *before* that amount has been justified with updated data would achieve this goal or be fair to those
15 policyholders who may be forced to drop coverage because they will no longer be able to afford
16 coverage due to the interim hikes.

17 Nor did any witness testify as to how the stipulation is fundamentally fair or in the interests of
18 justice when it allows State Farm to implement unjustified interim rate hikes starting June 1, 2025, while
19 at the same time it would allow State Farm to initiate new block nonrenewal programs starting six
20 months later on January 1, 2026, and to continue its currently ongoing block nonrenewal program
21 initiated in March 2024, under which it has already nonrenewed approximately 12,677 policyholders
22 and plans to nonrenew an additional 11,016 policyholders through year-end 2025.¹¹ Allowing unjustified
23 rate hikes on the very policyholders whose coverage may soon be canceled—without any commitment
24 to maintain their policies—cannot be called fundamentally fair or in the public interest.

25 And no testimony was provided by any State Farm or Department witness as to why the
26 stipulation’s term making its parent company State Farm Mutual’s commitment to provide a
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28 ¹⁰ IRH-SFG-101-07, lines 19–21.

¹¹ IRH-CDI-001 [Shaw Decl.], ¶ 17, lines 18–20.

1 \$400 million surplus note to its wholly owned subsidiary contingent on the imposition of \$749 million¹²
2 in unjustified rate hikes is fundamentally fair to policyholders or in the public interest. Even the
3 \$400 million will eventually have to be paid back with interest by State Farm out of underwriting and
4 investment income.

5 **State Farm’s financial condition is not a *legal* justification for a bailout.** State Farm’s
6 financial condition does not legally justify a policyholder-funded bailout in the form of unjustified
7 interim rate hikes and repayment of a loan from its parent company. Nor is the two-way stipulation
8 fundamentally fair, especially in the absence of any concrete commitments by State Farm that its
9 policyholders will not face immediate nonrenewal notices within days or months after their rate-hike
10 checks are cashed. “Thanks for the bailout, now get lost” is not fundamentally fair by any measure.

11 The stipulation’s provision related to potential for refunds does not cure these legal defects. State
12 Farm reserves its rights to challenge the Commissioner’s final rate order in court and tie up any refund
13 obligation, potentially for years. It is not fair, adequate, nor reasonable to take money from someone in
14 violation of the law—Proposition 103—with a future conditional promise to maybe pay some of it back
15 years in the future.

16 Based on the evidentiary record, Consumer Watchdog respectfully urges the Administrative Law
17 Judge to reject the proposed stipulation. The legal standards authorizing interim rate relief have not been
18 met. The regulatory standards establish that State Farm is not entitled to approval of any rate changes
19 until the noticed hearing on its rate applications is completed. And the regulatory standards for the
20 approval of settlements on stipulations have not been satisfied.

21 Contrary to State Farm’s mischaracterizations of Consumer Watchdog’s position, rejection of
22 State Farm and the Department’s proposed “stop-gap” measures is not an endorsement to “do nothing.”
23 (Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 160:12–13). It is an affirmation of the rule of law as enacted by the People
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25 ¹² IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025] at 3:20–4:9 (calculating impact of proposed
26 interim rates based on latest year adjusted earned annual premium values [Prem_Adjusted 2023Q4]
27 from State Farm’s interim rate templates contained in the record as IRH-SFG-136-04 [non-tenant
28 homeowners], IRH-SFG-137-04 [rental dwelling], and IRH-SFG-138-05 [renters] and 138-06 [condo
owners]).

1 in Proposition 103—not the rule of what favors the most powerful corporations at the expense of
2 unwitting consumers. State Farm will have a full opportunity to prove it is entitled to the rates it seeks—
3 using updated data through the first quarter of 2025—in the properly noticed evidentiary hearing.

4 **II. Procedural Background**

5 In June and July 2024, State Farm filed three rate applications requesting overall rate increases of
6 30% for its homeowners, 41.8% for its renters/condo, and 38% for its rental dwelling insurance policies,
7 relying on the insolvency variance under 10 CCR section 2644.27, subdivision (f)(6), also known as
8 Variance 6.¹³ Consumer Watchdog “initiated” these “proceeding[s]” by submitting a Petition for
9 Hearing, Petition to Intervene, and Notice of Intent to Seek Compensation in each of the three
10 applications pursuant to Insurance Code sections 1861.05, subdivision (a) and 1861.10, subdivision
11 (a).¹⁴ Consumer Watchdog also promptly sought discovery on July 26, 2024 and August 23, 2024,¹⁵ as
12 authorized by 10 CCR section 2655.1, subdivision (a), to assess State Farm’s claims under Variance 6.
13 Despite Consumer Watchdog’s repeated attempts to meet and confer with State Farm on its set I and
14 set II discovery requests on the homeowners rate application, State Farm did not respond to those
15 requests.

16 Following the January 2025 Los Angeles wildfires, State Farm submitted a letter directly to the
17 Commissioner on February 3, 2025, requesting the Commissioner’s immediate approval of “emergency”
18 interim rate increases of 21.8% for homeowners, 15% for renters/condo, and 38% for rental dwelling,
19 prior to the public hearing required by Insurance Code section 1861.05.¹⁶ On February 5, 2025,

21 ¹³ IRH-SFG-101-02. The parties have stipulated that all filings in the three rate applications (CDI File
22 No. 23-1271/SERFF # 134139896 (homeowners), No. 24-1273/SERFF # 134139931 (renters/condo
23 owners), and No. 24-1330/SERFF # 134139850 (rental dwelling)) as posted in the Systems for
24 Electronic Rates and Forms Filings (SERFF) as of April 8, 2025 are admitted into the record for the
hearing on the proposed interim rate stipulation. (Parties’ Revised Joint Exhibit List for Hearing on
Proposed Interim Rate Stipulation, Apr. 10, 2025, at 1:8–11.)

25 ¹⁴ Consumer Watchdog’s Petitions were timely submitted on July 26, 2024 for homeowners, August 19,
26 2024 for renters/condo, and August 26, 2024 for rental dwelling. (SFG-101-3 at lines 6–11.) Consumer
27 Watchdog’s Petitions to Intervene were granted on August 24, 2024 for homeowners, September 3,
2024 for renters/condo, and September 10, 2024 for rental dwelling. (*Id.* at lines 15–17.)

¹⁵ IRH-CWD-201 and 202.

28 ¹⁶ IRH-SFG-152. On February 5, 2025, State Farm submitted rate templates in support of its interim rate
requests, which confirmed its non-reliance on Variance 6. (IRH-SFG-136, 137, and 138.)

1 Consumer Watchdog submitted a letter to the Commissioner outlining its procedural and substantive
2 objections to the request.¹⁷ On February 7, 2025, State Farm and the Department submitted a two-way
3 stipulation directly to the Commissioner requesting his approval of State Farm’s interim rate requests
4 without following the procedure for approval of stipulations under 10 CCR section 2656.1.¹⁸ Consumer
5 Watchdog objected to the two-way stipulation in its February 7 letter to the Department, which it also
6 transmitted to the Commissioner that same day, outlining numerous issues with the stipulation,
7 including: (1) State Farm’s current rates were not inadequate under the rate regulations; (2) the proposed
8 interim rates were not actuarially justified; (3) State Farm had yet to turn over any documents in
9 response to Consumer Watchdog’s requests to support its claims that it is at risk of becoming insolvent;
10 (4) State Farm had not explained why its parent company State Farm Mutual, with \$194 *billion* in
11 reserves and surplus, was not willing to assist State Farm General as it had in other states; (5) no
12 authority was provided for approving rate hikes to maintain State Farm’s financial strength rating; and
13 (6) State Farm had not agreed that it would not immediately file a new rate application seeking even
14 higher rates or refrain from challenging the Commissioner’s final rate order and any refund obligation in
15 court. Consumer Watchdog also noted that any stipulation must be reviewed and approved by an
16 administrative law judge or else the matter must proceed to an evidentiary hearing under the Insurance
17 Code, Administrative Procedure Act, and the Department’s regulations.¹⁹

18 In response, Commissioner Lara scheduled two “informal” meetings with the parties to discuss
19 the interim rate requests. He first held an in-person meeting with all three parties on February 26, 2025,
20 and then a subsequent virtual meeting on March 11, 2025.²⁰ At the March 11 meeting, Commissioner
21 Lara asked State Farm to agree to two conditions. First, he asked State Farm to obtain a \$500 million
22 “loan or capital infusion” from its parent company.²¹ Second, he asked State Farm to “pause any
23 pending non-renewals and cancellations for *all of its policyholders throughout California* through the
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26 ¹⁷ IRH-CWD-208.

27 ¹⁸ IRH-SFG-101.

28 ¹⁹ IRH-CWD-210.

²⁰ IRH-SFG-180 and 181.

²¹ IRH-SFG-181 [Mar. 11, 2025 Transcript] at 6:00–6:34.

1 end of 2025.”²² State Farm and the Commissioner’s office exchanged communications regarding those
2 conditions over the following days, but State Farm refused to agree to the proposed additional terms.²³
3 On March 14, 2025, the Commissioner issued an Order calling for: (1) an April 8, 2025 hearing
4 concerning whether the two-way stipulation for interim rates should be approved; and (2) a formal
5 Notice of Hearing to be issued on State Farm’s rate applications requiring an evidentiary hearing on its
6 final rates to be commenced no later than June 1, 2025. The Notice of Hearing was subsequently issued
7 by the Department on March 17, 2025, and the February 7 two-way stipulation was transmitted to the
8 Administrative Hearing Bureau (“AHB”) that same day as an exhibit to the Notice of Hearing.
9 Consumer Watchdog timely filed its objections to the two-way stipulation to interim rates with AHB
10 pursuant to 10 CCR section 2656.1 on March 26. The Administrative Law Judge subsequently ordered
11 the Department and State Farm to file any supporting declarations and any amended stipulation no later
12 than April 2, with any supplemental objections by Consumer Watchdog due no later than the first day of
13 the April 8 hearing on the two-way stipulation and Consumer Watchdog’s objections.²⁴

14 The Department filed and served a supporting declaration on April 2,²⁵ while State Farm’s three
15 declarations were late-filed and served near midnight on April 3.²⁶ Without any notice or request for an
16 extension, the Department late-filed a “supplement” to the stipulation on April 4—two days after the
17 court-ordered deadline.²⁷ This “supplement” revised the proposed homeowners interim rate to 17%,
18 provided for a \$400 million surplus note from State Farm Mutual conditioned on approval of the
19 requested interim rate hikes, and provided that State Farm will not initiate new block nonrenewals until
20 January 1, 2026, but will continue its ongoing nonrenewal program that was initiated in March 2024
21 (which includes approximately 11,000 remaining nonrenewals that will be completed by year-end 2025).

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²² *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

26 ²³ IRH-CWD-220, 221, and 223.

27 ²⁴ Amended Notice of Hearing on Stipulation and Order, Mar. 27, 2025, pp. 1–2.

28 ²⁵ IRH-CDI-001.

²⁶ IRH-SFG-103, 109, and 110.

²⁷ IRH-SFG-102.

1 No supporting declarations were filed with the April 4 supplement addressing the final agreed-upon
2 terms.²⁸

3 Consumer Watchdog timely lodged and served its supplemental objections and declaration the
4 evening before the April 8 deadline. Consumer Watchdog also filed three motions in limine on April 7,
5 seeking to exclude (1) evidence of State Farm’s financial condition, (2) the late-filed supplement to the
6 stipulation, and (3) any Risk-Based-Capital (“RBC”) calculations. The first two were denied orally on
7 the record by the Administrative Law Judge on April 8.²⁹ Consumer Watchdog subsequently filed
8 further briefing in support of the third motion in limine to exclude RBC evidence on April 9, with State
9 Farm filing an opposition on April 9, CDI filing an opposition on April 10, and Consumer Watchdog
10 filing a reply on April 10.³⁰ Additionally, on April 8, the ALJ granted a motion by the Department to
11 exclude the testimony of State Farm’s expert witness Nancy Watkins based on her direct conflict of
12 interest under her pre-existing ongoing contractual relationship with the Department to consult on the
13 adoption of regulations related to reinsurance costs.³¹ The three-day evidentiary hearing on the interim
14 rate stipulation, which included presentation of additional oral direct testimony and cross-examination of
15 each of the parties’ witnesses, was completed on April 10, and the ALJ ordered the parties to submit any
16 post-hearing briefs no later than April 23.³²

17 **III. The Legal Standard for Interim Rate Relief**

18 Proposition 103 established a prior approval system of rate regulation under which insurers have
19 the burden of proving their requested rates are legally and actuarially justified before they take effect.
20 (Ins. Code §§ 1861.01, 1861.05.) It affords consumer representatives the right to mandatory hearings on
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22 ²⁸ The declaration of Tina Shaw submitted on April 2 by the Department said she was supporting the
23 original February 7 stipulation with proposed additional terms, which differed from the terms of the
24 April 4 supplement. State Farm’s declarants in their April 2 submissions only discussed State Farm’s
25 original interim rate relief request set forth in the February 7 stipulation and did not opine on the
26 additional terms of the April 4 supplement or its overall fairness, as it was not in existence at the time
27 they prepared and signed their declarations.

28 ²⁹ Apr. 8, 2025 Transcript at 76:10–14.

³⁰ The Administrative Law Judge indicated that he would defer a ruling and address the RBC-related
issues raised by this briefing in his proposed decision. (Apr. 8, 2025 Transcript at 76:15–16; Apr. 10,
2025 Transcript at 120:4–8.)

³¹ Apr. 8, 2025 Transcript at 71:10–12.

³² Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 139:6–9.

1 challenges to proposed rate increases exceeding 7% for personal lines (Ins. Code § 1861.05, subd. (c))
2 and provides that hearings must be held before administrative law judges under the procedural
3 protections of the Administrative Procedure Act (Ins. Code § 1861.08). The California Supreme Court
4 held that in very limited circumstances pending the determination of a final rate, “the commissioner has
5 the power to grant interim relief *from plainly invalid rates*.” (*Calfarm, supra*, 48 Cal.3d at p. 824,
6 emphasis added.) The Court determined that this “power to grant interim relief...may fairly be implied
7 from [Proposition 103’s] command that ‘[n]o rate shall ... *remain in effect* which is excessive,
8 inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of this chapter.’” (*Id.* at p. 825, quoting Ins.
9 Code § 1861.05, subd. (a), italics in original; see also *20th Century, supra*, 8 Cal.4th at p. 245 [same].)
10 Thus, under *Calfarm*, the Commissioner’s authority to grant interim rate relief is implied from, and
11 limited to, enforcing the “remain in effect” language of Insurance Code section 1861.05, subdivision (a).
12 That means that to justify the approval of an interim rate, the “in effect” rate must be “excessive,
13 inadequate, unfairly discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of [Proposition 103],” i.e., plainly invalid.

14 “The ratemaking formula is used to fix for the individual insurer the range of rates within the
15 bounds of the ‘excessive’ and the ‘inadequate.’” (*20th Century, supra*, 8 Cal.4th at p. 285.) Under
16 Proposition 103’s prior approval regulations, “a rate is ‘excessive’ if it is higher than the maximum
17 permitted earned premium [10 CCR § 2644.2]. It is ‘inadequate’ if it is lower than the minimum
18 permitted earned premium [10 CCR § 2644.3].” (*Id.* at p. 254.) State Farm does not deny that, as its own
19 calculations confirm, its in-effect homeowners, renters, and condo rates fall within the bounds of
20 permissible rates under the prior approval regulations and are thus not invalid, negating any grounds for
21 interim rate relief.

22 The Commissioner correctly quoted the “plainly invalid” legal standard articulated in *Calfarm*
23 and *20th Century* when he initially responded to State Farm’s request, stated “the burden is on State
24 Farm to demonstrate that interim relief is warranted under the circumstances,” and found that at that
25 time, State Farm had not met its burden.³³ Neither the Department nor State Farm have identified any
26 other legal authority for approving interim rates. While they both rely primarily on their witnesses’
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³³ IRH-SFG-149-02.

1 testimony regarding State Farm’s “deteriorating financial condition” and potential consequences of its
2 financial strength rating being downgraded if it doesn’t get approval of its requested rate hikes quickly
3 enough, these are not valid grounds for interim rate relief under any legal authority.

4 While State Farm claims that its proposed interim rates can be approved solely on the grounds
5 that the stipulation is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable,³⁴ or alternatively that “the
6 Commissioner can approve an interim rate that helps keep insurance available in California,”³⁵ it cites
7 no legal authority which has so held, and the legal standard for approving interim rates does not change
8 simply because the Department and State Farm have agreed to proposed interim rates by stipulation.
9 State Farm’s claim that it meets the “plainly invalid” standard because “an interim rate increase will help
10 preserve insurance availability in California”³⁶ entirely ignores *Calfarm*, which inferred the authority for
11 interim rate relief from the statutory prohibition on invalid rates “remain[ing] in effect.” While it is true
12 that one of Proposition 103’s purposes is “ensur[ing] that insurance is fair, available, and affordable for
13 all Californians,”³⁷ that purpose is effectuated through the statutory scheme. There is no statutory basis
14 for implying a broad exception to prior approval in service of general claims about insurance
15 availability. If that were enough, every insurer could use a threat of non-renewals as a basis for
16 immediate interim rate relief, spelling the end of the prior approval system.

17 The recent LA fires likewise do not provide a legal basis for granting interim rate relief. The
18 two-way stipulation states that an interim rate increase “would be lawfully issued” ... “in furtherance of
19 the Governor’s Executive Order N-13-23,” and also cites the Governor’s Proclamation of a State of
20 Emergency and the Commissioner’s Declaration of Emergency Situation in the wake of the recent Los
21 Angeles area fires,³⁸ but there is no statute, regulation, or caselaw that provides an “emergency” grounds
22 for interim rate relief, and none of the cited documents purport to authorize interim rate increases in
23 these circumstances or otherwise alter the prior approval system under Proposition 103, nor could they.

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26 ³⁴ Apr. 8, 2025 Transcript at 87:9–24.

27 ³⁵ *Id.* at 88:25–89:6.

28 ³⁶ Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 165:4–6.

³⁷ Proposition 103, uncodified section 2.

³⁸ IRH-SFG-101-03, line 27, to 101-04, line 4; 101-04, lines 10–12; and 101-07, lines 14–19.

1 The regulatory standard to be applied by the administrative law judge in determining to approve
2 or reject a stipulation—whether it is “in the public interest” and is “taken as a whole, fundamentally fair,
3 adequate, and reasonable” and “in the interests of justice” (10 CCR §§ 2656.1, subd. (c); 2656.2)—does
4 not replace or override the standard for granting interim rate relief pursuant to the Commissioner’s
5 implied authority under Insurance Code section 1861.05. To be perfectly clear, there are two distinct
6 legal standards that must be met here for the stipulation to be adopted. First, the court must determine
7 whether interim rate relief is prospectively justified because State Farm’s current rates are plainly
8 invalid. Only if the answer to that question is yes does the court evaluate whether the stipulation for
9 interim rates is “fundamentally fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the interests of justice.” State Farm’s
10 apparent belief that there is no legal standard whatsoever for evaluating whether interim rates are
11 justified flies in the face of logic and case law and raises the specter that the Commissioner would have
12 standardless discretion to approve interim rates not reached through a stipulation. The regulations do not
13 authorize the imposition of interim rates, by stipulation or otherwise, untethered from a clear showing of
14 necessity for relief from plainly invalid rates.

15 **IV. The Amended Stipulation’s Proposed Interim Rates Cannot Be Approved Under *Calfarm***

16 Even setting aside the procedural and legal deficiencies of the late-filed April 4 “supplement” to
17 the two-way stipulation, the interim rates proposed by State Farm cannot be approved under the
18 governing legal standard absent any testimony or evidence showing that its in effect rates are “plainly
19 invalid.” (*Calfarm, supra*, 48 Cal.3d at p. 824.) The burden of proof lies squarely with the insurer. (Ins.
20 Code § 1861.05, subd. (b).)

21 Here, State Farm has not made that showing. According to its own calculations under the rate
22 templates it submitted in support of its proposed interim rates—using its amount of insurance year trend,
23 loss development factors, and revised catastrophe load weightings—State Farm’s current homeowners,
24 tenants, and condo unit owners rates fall within the boundaries of the minimum and maximum rates.³⁹
25 Its homeowners rate indications range from -11.5% to +21.8%.⁴⁰ Likewise, its renters rate indications

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27 ³⁹ IRH-SFG-136-04 [non-tenant homeowners], 138-05 [renters], and 138-06 [condo owners].

28 ⁴⁰ IRH-SFG-136-04; IRH-CWD-253 [Armstrong Decl., Mar. 24, 2025], ¶ 6 (“In order to demonstrate
plainly inadequate rates, an insurer’s minimum rate change within the Prior Approval Rate Template
must be greater than 0.0%. And yet the minimum rate change shown in State Farm’s interim

1 range from -15.3% to +16.6%,⁴¹ and its condo owners rate indications range from -12.8% to +20.0%.⁴²
2 Thus, State Farm’s own calculations confirm that its in effect homeowners, renters, and condo rates are
3 not plainly invalid—they do not fall outside the range of rates that are neither inadequate nor
4 excessive—and that no interim increase can be justified under *Calfarm*.⁴³

5 Consumer Watchdog’s actuary was the only witness who conducted an independent analysis
6 considering four alternative scenarios using State Farm’s data and, where applicable, State Farm’s own
7 assumptions. This analysis is not based on fully updated data necessary to determine a final rate
8 indication but reflects where the analysis is at this point in time given the currently available data. The
9 results are consistent: under each of those four scenarios, State Farm’s current homeowners rate falls
10 within a lawful range.⁴⁴

11 To be clear, contrary to State Farm’s claims, the “plainly invalid” standard for interim rate relief
12 under *Calfarm* is not “the standard that applies at a full rate hearing.”⁴⁵ Rather, it is the threshold
13 showing that must be met for legal entitlement to interim relief. For example, if the Department’s initial
14 analysis of an insurer’s rate application showed that the minimum permitted premium rate change was
15 positive, the Department would have a basis for recommending approval of interim rate increases
16 sufficient to make the insurer’s rates “adequate,” i.e. “valid,” so as to comply with Insurance Code
17 section 1861.05, subdivision (a). Here, neither the Department’s nor State Farm’s own analyses provide
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19

20 Homeowners Rate Template is a decrease of 11.5%, for Renters it is a decrease of 15.3%, and for Condo
21 it is a decrease of 12.8%”); see also IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 5.

22 ⁴¹ IRH-SFG-138-05.

23 ⁴² IRH-SFG-138-06.

24 ⁴³ As to its rental dwelling coverage, while State Farm’s interim rate calculation resulted in a minimum
25 indicated rate change of +3.2 (IRH-SFG-137-04), no admitted State Farm or CDI witness testimony
26 supported this indication with any independent actuarial analysis. The analysis performed by Consumer
27 Watchdog’s actuary resulted in a minimum permitted rate indication of -5.1% (IRH-CWD-253 at p.
28 CWD-767 [Armstrong Decl., Mar. 24, 2025, Exh. B]), which would support a finding that the current
rate (0% change) for this coverage is not plainly inadequate as it falls above this minimum under the
prior approval regulations.

⁴⁴ See also IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 5; Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at
104:10–19. See also *id.* at 41:7 (no rate analysis conducted by Appel; *id.* at 79:13–20 (no rate analysis
by Erhart); April 10, 2025 Transcript at 41:14–18 (no rate analysis by Shaw).

⁴⁵ State Farm’s Brief in Support of Interim Rate, Apr. 2, 2025, at 6; Apr. 8, 2025 Transcript at 12–15.

1 that threshold showing for approving its homeowners, renters, and condo owners interim rate requests.
2 Therefore, its requests must be denied.

3 **V. The Declarations and Testimony of State Farm’s and the Department’s Witnesses Do Not**
4 **Establish a Legal Basis for Interim Rate Relief**

5 Not one of State Farm’s or the Department’s witnesses affirmed in their sworn declarations or
6 testimony that State Farm’s current rates are plainly invalid (or “inadequate” under the prior approval
7 rate regulations), and no declarant provided sworn statements or testimony with sufficient reasons to
8 support a finding that the two-way stipulation as amended by the April 4 supplement is “fundamentally
9 fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the interests of justice.”

10 **A. David Appel – State Farm**

11 David Appel submitted a declaration in support of the February 7 two-way stipulation. Appel
12 confirmed on cross examination that he did not evaluate whether State Farm’s current rates or proposed
13 interim rates fall within the permissible minimum and maximum permitted earned premium range under
14 10 CCR sections 2644.2 and 2644.3.⁴⁶ His declaration and testimony centered on his viewpoints as a
15 longtime insurance industry consultant and former Milliman principal,⁴⁷ as evidenced by his testimony
16 attacking Proposition 103 and the intervenor process.⁴⁸ Large swaths of his testimony were devoted to
17 discussion of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (“NAIC”) RBC measures of
18 solvency,⁴⁹ which are statutorily prohibited under Insurance Code section 789.3, subdivision (c) from
19 being used in ratemaking or considered or introduced as evidence in ratemaking proceedings.⁵⁰

20 **1. Appel Blamed Proposition 103 and the CDI for State Farm’s Deteriorating**
21 **Financial Condition.**

22 Appel’s attempt to attribute a deterioration in SFG’s financial condition to California’s
23 regulatory framework lacked factual foundation and ignored SFG’s own business decisions. Indeed,
24 Appel framed State Farm as a victim—claiming Proposition 103 and intervenor challenges are

25 ⁴⁶ Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 35:21–36:4.

26 ⁴⁷ IRH-SFG-103 [Appel Decl.], ¶¶ 3–5.

27 ⁴⁸ *Id.* at ¶¶ 47–49.

28 ⁴⁹ *Id.* at ¶¶ 30–36; Apr. 8, 2025 Transcript at 135:13–143:5.

⁵⁰ See Consumer Watchdog’s Motion in Limine No. 3 to Exclude Evidence Regarding RBC, Apr. 7, 2025, and further briefing and reply filed on April 9 and 10.

responsible for “why SFG have filed rate increases of 7.0% or less when the indications are substantially higher”⁵¹—but the evidence shows the company strategically avoided filing for full rate relief and is now seeking to leverage a perceived crisis to extract regulatory concessions.

<u>CDI File #</u>	<u>Effective Date</u>	<u>Overall Effect (%)</u>			
		<u>Non-Tenant Homeowners</u>	<u>Renters</u>	<u>Condominium Unitowners</u>	<u>Total Homeowners</u>
22-1514	06/01/2023	6.9	N/A	6.9	N/A
21-1404	02/01/2022	6.9	N/A	N/A	N/A
19-0263	04/01/2021	6.9	0.0	0.0	6.0
18-4896	10/15/2020	6.9	6.9	3.1	6.7
18-1196	07/15/2018	6.9	4.0	6.9	6.7
14-8381	12/08/2016	-5.4	-20.4	-13.8	-7.0

(IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 18; Exh. IRH-CWD-234.)

Appel’s underlying premise—that large rate increases were impossible to obtain—is refuted by SFG’s own experience. In 2023, the company filed for a 28.1% increase. The Department and Consumer Watchdog stipulated to a 20% increase *without* a hearing. (IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 21.) This directly undermines the claim that Proposition 103 or the intervenor process barred State Farm from obtaining meaningful relief. It is notable that State Farm is the only California insurer demanding emergency interim rate increases, despite every other insurer being subject to the same regulatory requirements, indicating that the problem lies not with Proposition 103, but with State Farm itself.

2. Appel Failed to Address the Standards for Approving Interim Rates.

Most fundamentally, Appel never quantified State Farm’s existing rates as “inadequate,” “confiscatory,” or otherwise invalid under the applicable standards, nor opined what the justifiable rate should be under California law. Appel did not apply or even cite the regulatory ratemaking formula under 10 CCR section 2644.1 et seq., and he confirmed on cross-examination that he did not analyze

⁵¹ IRH-SFG-103 [Appel Decl.], ¶¶ 47–49.

1 whether the proposed 21.8% or 17% increase falls between the minimum and maximum permitted
2 earned premium levels defined in 10 CCR sections 2644.2 and 2644.3.⁵²

3 Nor did Appel, who is not an actuary, assess whether the proposed rates satisfy actuarial
4 standards. The Statement of Principles Regarding Property and Casualty Insurance Ratemaking by the
5 Casualty Actuarial Society requires that a rate be “an actuarially sound estimate of the expected value of
6 all future costs associated with an individual risk transfer.”⁵³ Appel provided no such estimate, and his
7 declaration did not cite or apply this principle.

8 Instead, Appel revealed his primary allegiance to the insurance industry, not the interests of
9 consumers, by claiming that the Commissioner’s primary role is to protect insurer solvency,⁵⁴ and that
10 policyholders face no real risk if the interim rate is excessive because refunds will be provided later.⁵⁵
11 This reasoning ignores basic economic reality. Policyholders operate under financial constraints, and
12 many of these same consumers in the Los Angeles area are struggling right now to recover from the
13 January 2025 fires. Excessive premiums—even if eventually refundable months or years later after State
14 Farm exhausts its legal challenges to any final rate order it disagrees with—can force consumers to drop
15 coverage, accept higher deductibles, or forgo other essential expenses. If an interim rate increase causes
16 coverage disruptions or financial hardship, those consequences cannot be undone by a later refund.

17 In fact, Appel betrays even his basic understanding of economics in favor of his biased advocacy
18 for State Farm. Appel testified during cross-examination that he sees “virtually no downside risk to
19 granting” State Farm’s interim rate request.⁵⁶ He also expressed his opinion that “whatever the parties
20 have agreed to,” as pertains to the amount of the interim rate request, is “absolutely necessary,” despite
21 not having conducted a rate analysis of any kind.⁵⁷ He went on to opine specifically that “[t]here’s no
22 obvious economic risk to policyholders” in granting an interim rate increase,⁵⁸ and that the risk of any
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25 ⁵² Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 35:25–36:4.

26 ⁵³ IRH-CWD-240 at p. 2.

27 ⁵⁴ IRH-SFG-103 [Appel Decl.], ¶ 27.

28 ⁵⁵ *Id.*, ¶¶ 10e, 60; Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 41–42.

⁵⁶ *Id.* at 36:8–9.

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 40:6–41:7.

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 42:19–20.

1 refunds owed by State Farm never materializing are “virtually none.”⁵⁹ Appel expressly discounts risks
2 to all policyholders to 0.0%—an incredible leap unsupported by anyone who has ever taken an Econ 101
3 class.

4 In sum, Appel’s declaration and testimony provided a case in favor of deregulation, not a
5 technical or actuarial justification for interim rate relief based on the applicable legal standard. He made
6 speculative assertions about what might happen if State Farm does not “immediately receive higher
7 premiums” to improve its surplus (which he admitted will take time regardless of when those rate
8 increases are approved),⁶⁰ and unsubstantiated claims about California’s regulatory environment. His
9 declaration and testimony failed to demonstrate that the current rates are plainly invalid or that the
10 proposed stipulation is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable. As such, they should be afforded
11 no weight.

12 **B. Bryon Ehrhart – State Farm**

13 Ehrhart’s declaration and testimony function as a red herring, diverting attention from the
14 essential actuarial and legal questions that must guide this rate proceeding. Ehrhart, a senior executive at
15 Aon, provided general observations about reinsurance and reinsurance markets⁶¹ and State Farm’s
16 reinsurance program,⁶² and offered a misplaced critique of Consumer Watchdog’s reinsurance
17 analysis,⁶³ but provided no testimony at all containing analysis or opinion supporting State Farm’s
18 proposed interim rate increases, its financial strength, or any other terms within the two-way
19 stipulation—he admitted his testimony was just focused on reinsurance—“I’m here to talk about the
20 reinsurance.”⁶⁴

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22 ⁵⁹ *Id.* at 43:7–9.

23 ⁶⁰ IRH-SFG-103 [Appel Decl.], ¶ 44.

24 ⁶¹ IRH-SFG-109 [Ehrhart Decl.], ¶¶ 6–14.

25 ⁶² *Id.* at ¶¶ 15–22.

26 ⁶³ *Id.* at ¶¶ 23–39.

27 ⁶⁴ Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 79:13–80:4 (emphasis added):

28 Q. Okay. So you have – You’re here today, you’re expressing no opinion on the amount
of the interim rate request that is being sought by State Farm General?

A. I’m here to talk about the reinsurance

Q. And you also are not here to testify to about State Farm General’s financial strength?

1 His role is clearly limited to attempting to rebut a limited set of Consumer Watchdog’s initial
2 written objections to the first stipulation related to reinsurance levels and returns, rather than
3 independently supporting either of the actual stipulations, which he admits he has not analyzed.

4 During his testimony, Ehrhart acknowledged critical points undermining State Farm’s claims.
5 Specifically, he confirmed that over 80% of State Farm’s catastrophe reinsurance coverage is placed
6 with its parent company State Farm Mutual or with other affiliated reinsurers under State Farm Mutual’s
7 common control.⁶⁵ He stated that these arrangements are priced below market rates and without State
8 Farm’s “strong parentage,” such arrangements would not be available from unaffiliated reinsurers.⁶⁶
9 This acknowledgment significantly weakens State Farm’s claim of operating independently and suggests
10 that any reported financial difficulties may be self-inflicted through favorable internal pricing
11 arrangements.

12 Ehrhart also provided speculative testimony regarding the consequences of a potential
13 downgrade in State Farm’s financial strength rating, stating it could result in homeowners being forced
14 to obtain alternative insurance at “potentially a substantially increased price.”⁶⁷ Under cross-
15 examination, Ehrhart conceded that this speculation was based mainly on his personal experience rather
16 than any quantifiable analysis or specific data supporting the likelihood or extent of such a price
17 increase.⁶⁸

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22 A. No. **It’s on the reinsurance**, which of course is a component of its financial strength,
23 but **I’m talking about the reinsurance**.

24 Q. Right. And you would not also be here to opine on financial strength ratings in
25 general?

26 A. **I’m not opining on them. I’m just characterizing how the reinsurance program**
27 **impacts them**

28 ⁶⁵ IRH-SFG-109 [Ehrhart Decl.], ¶¶ 19–20; Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 70:25–71:9 (“ . . . more than 80
percent is with its parent and its affiliates . . . ”).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ IRH-SFG-109 [Ehrhart Decl.], ¶ 14.

⁶⁸ Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 91:3–92:17.

1 Moreover, Ehrhart inaccurately characterized Consumer Watchdog’s position, stating Consumer
2 Watchdog claimed that State Farm had purchased “too much reinsurance.”⁶⁹ Under questioning, Ehrhart
3 was unable to substantiate this claim—“[m]aybe I misconstrued that.”⁷⁰

4 Consumer Watchdog, in fact, has consistently argued the opposite—that State Farm under-
5 protected itself in certain critical periods. Specifically, Consumer Watchdog noted that from 2017–2018,
6 State Farm’s catastrophe occurrence reinsurance attachment point was excessively high at \$1 billion,
7 meaning State Farm was effectively uninsured for significant initial losses.⁷¹ Only in subsequent years,
8 2019–2024, did State Farm reduce its attachment point to a more reasonable \$250 million,
9 demonstrating previous inadequacies in risk management decisions.⁷² Ehrhart’s suggestion that
10 Consumer Watchdog somehow uniformly opposes reinsurance purchases is inaccurate.

11 In conclusion, Ehrhart’s declaration and testimony fail to provide independent or substantial
12 support for the proposed interim rate increase. His generalized observations about the purpose of
13 reinsurance provide background information—which Consumer Watchdog does not dispute—but
14 nothing more. But his speculative assertions and mischaracterizations of Consumer Watchdog’s
15 positions limit the relevance and reliability of his contributions. Therefore, his testimony should be
16 given minimal evidentiary weight in these proceedings.

17 **C. Tina Shaw – CDI**

18 Tina Shaw, Chief Actuary for the California Department of Insurance, submitted a declaration,
19 not in support of the February 7 Stipulation or the April 4 Supplement, but rather requesting a proposed
20 decision from the ALJ approving a 17.0% interim homeowners rate increase with State Farm
21 additionally required to obtain a \$400 million surplus note from its parent company. While Shaw
22 characterized the interim measure as a “stop-gap,”⁷³ her analysis raises a number of concerns regarding
23 both the justification for interim rate relief and the assumptions underlying her evaluation.

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26 ⁶⁹ IRH-SFG-109 [Ehrhart Decl.], ¶ 25.

27 ⁷⁰ Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 93:14–15.

28 ⁷¹ IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 9; IRH-CWD-233, p. CWD-472.

⁷² IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 9.

⁷³ IRH-CDI-001 [Shaw Decl.], ¶ 3.

1 Most notably, Shaw stated that “we cannot solely focus on technical rating issues while ignoring
2 the fact that, should Applicant become insolvent, the health of the entire marketplace will continue to
3 deteriorate.”⁷⁴ This line of reasoning echoes the “too big to fail” logic advanced by State Farm in
4 Appel’s declaration (and throughout these proceedings). But this unsupported general statement about
5 potential marketplace impact cannot alone justify imposing unwarranted costs on State Farm
6 policyholders through unjustified interim rate increases without a demonstration that State Farm’s
7 current rates are “plainly invalid.” As a matter of fundamental fairness, marketplace health must not be
8 propped up through unjustified charges to individual homeowners, who otherwise have no equity in
9 State Farm.

10 Shaw’s core argument for the interim increase is based on State Farm’s RBC ratios.⁷⁵ Shaw
11 calculated RBC values herself using publicly available data using NAIC RBC Instructions.⁷⁶ As argued
12 in Consumer Watchdog’s April 7 Motion in Limine No. 3, Insurance Code section 739.8, subdivision
13 (c), which she cites, provides that the RBC Instructions “shall not be used by the commissioner for
14 ratemaking nor considered or introduced as evidence in any rate proceeding, nor used by the
15 commissioner to calculate or derive any elements of an appropriate premium level or rate of return.”
16 Thus, Ms. Shaw’s discussion of RBC values she calculated pursuant to the RBC Instructions should be
17 stricken.⁷⁷

18 Shaw’s declaration, though submitted by the Department, does not support approval of the
19 original stipulation as signed nor the April 4 supplement. Shaw conceded that the 17% interim rate she
20 proposed was not based on any independent calculation of the appropriate max/min permitted rate
21 indication under the ratemaking formula, and that she did not calculate the actual rate impact of either
22 the parent’s capital infusion or State Farm’s ongoing non-renewal program, which she states “will be
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25 ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

26 ⁷⁵ *Id.*, ¶¶ 9–13.

27 ⁷⁶ *Id.*, ¶ 10.

28 ⁷⁷ See Consumer Watchdog’s Motion in Limine No. 3 to Exclude Evidence Regarding RBC, Apr. 7, 2025, and further briefing and reply filed on April 9 and 10; see also Consumer Watchdog’s Notice Identifying RBC-Related Testimony, filed on April 23, 2025.

investigated fully during the rate hearing process once additional data and support are available.”⁷⁸ That concession confirms that the proposed interim rate lacks a developed evidentiary foundation. Her declaration recommended the reduction from 21.8% to 17% only to address “concerns” and “possibilities.” And at the hearing, Shaw admitted that the reduction to 17% was not even reflective of a qualitative assessment of an appropriate reduction; rather, “[i]t was given to me by my counsel.”⁷⁹

Ratemaking under Proposition 103 should not proceed purely on speculation, even for an interim rate. Most critically, nowhere in her declaration does Shaw attest that State Farm’s current rates are plainly invalid under the legal standard warranting interim relief now rather than waiting for approval after the required evidentiary showing is made. She admitted on cross examination that she had not performed such an analysis.⁸⁰ Her declaration and testimony highlight that the two-way stipulation and supplement are not fundamentally fair to policyholders who may be forced to leave the company because they cannot afford unjustified interim rate hikes and who will receive no commitment from State Farm that if they do pay the higher premiums, their policies will remain in force and not be subject to a new block nonrenewal program starting immediately on January 1, 2026. Shaw also did not explain how requiring State Farm policyholders pay hundreds of millions in unjustified rate hikes now, plus eventually repaying the \$400 million surplus note to State Farm Mutual, is fundamentally fair or in the interests of justice. In sum, Ms. Shaw’s declaration and testimony ultimately support rejecting the proposed interim rate hikes and proceeding to an expedited full rate hearing, based on a developed evidentiary record.

* * * *

Taken together, these declarations may offer some broader context about State Farm’s financial condition. But none provides a fully developed analysis grounded in the law, actuarial principles, and analysis. And none demonstrates that either the February 7 or the April 4 stipulations meet the legal

⁷⁸ IRH-CDI-001 [Shaw Decl.], ¶¶ 2, 18; see also Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 41:14–18 [admitting she did not independently run rate calculations under rate regulations or otherwise determine whether State Farm’s loss and cat load projections are actuarially sound].

⁷⁹ Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 45:24–25.

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 48:4–7.

standards for interim rate approval or fundamental fairness. For those reasons, the declarations do not justify interim relief.

VI. State Farm’s Agreement to Not Initiate Any New Block Renewal Programs Until January 1, 2026 Does Not Make the Stipulation Fair, Reasonable, or in the Interests of Justice

Under the April 4 supplement to the two-way stipulation, State Farm would implement unjustified interim rate hikes starting June 1, 2025, while at the same time it would continue with its plans to nonrenew the remaining 11,000 policyholders under its currently ongoing block nonrenewal program initiated in March 2024, under which it has already nonrenewed approximately 12,677 policyholders since July 2024.⁸¹ Further, its promise to not initiate any new block nonrenewal programs through year-end 2025 is functionally worthless when it could immediately seek to initiate new block nonrenewal programs starting in six months on January 1, 2026. Ms. Shaw could not explain on cross-examination how imposing interim rate hikes on policyholders before they are justified with updated data and without any commitments by State Farm that their policies will remain in force beyond six months is fundamentally fair or in the public interest,⁸² nor how it will promote the Department’s stated goal of maximizing the availability of homeowners insurance.⁸³

VII. State Farm’s Criticisms of Mr. Armstrong’s Actuarial Analyses Do Not Alter or Negate His Fundamental Conclusion

On cross-examination, State Farm attempted to impugn Mr. Armstrong’s credibility by making a number of baseless and largely irrelevant criticisms, pursuant to which it argued “Mr. Armstrong’s pattern of errors call into question the reliability of his analysis as a whole, and his testimony should not be entitled to any weight in these proceedings.”⁸⁴ The court should reject this invitation because none of the issues identified by State Farm alter Mr. Armstrong’s fundamental conclusion—that State Farm’s current rates are not plainly invalid, so no interim rate increase is warranted.

⁸¹ IRH-CDI-001 [Shaw Decl.], ¶ 17, lines 18–20.

⁸² Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 62:19–63:10; 76:2–10.

⁸³ *Id.* at 81:3–7.

⁸⁴ *Id.* at 167:8–12.

1 For example, it was pointed out by State Farm’s counsel that Mr. Armstrong referred to a State
2 Farm filing’s “filing date” instead of its “effective date”⁸⁵; however, this does not alter the facts that
3 State Farm requested and received approval of multiple 6.9% rate increases for its homeowners line
4 from 2018–2023 when it could have requested higher rates.⁸⁶

5 State Farm’s counsel also questioned why Mr. Armstrong did not provide more details to
6 “explain” the CAT/AIY weighting scheme he used for his original (scenario 1) rate analysis, even
7 though Mr. Armstrong explained in his March 24 Declaration that he used the weighting scheme used
8 by State Farm in their original filings⁸⁷ and further explained this methodology on cross-examination.⁸⁸
9 And Mr. Armstrong further explained on cross-examination how his net trend value resulted from using
10 20-point reported/paid trend selections,⁸⁹ which he considered to be “more actuarially sound and result
11 in a more reasonable rate indication.”⁹⁰ None of the criticisms by State Farm calling for further details,
12 however, have any bearing on Mr. Armstrong’s ultimate conclusions.

13 Mr. Armstrong has consistently testified throughout this proceeding, via declarations, direct
14 examination, and cross examination, that State Farm’s in effect rates are not plainly invalid. State Farm
15 has been unable to show otherwise, and its attacks on Mr. Armstrong’s credibility belie its inability to do
16 so.

17 As discussed in his April 7 Supplemental Declaration, Mr. Armstrong’s actuarial analysis shows
18 that State Farm’s in effect homeowners rates cannot be deemed plainly invalid, even using variables and
19 assumptions that are most favorable to State Farm under five alternative scenarios.⁹¹ This was confirmed
20 by Mr. Armstrong during direct examination when he described each of the scenarios in detail⁹² and
21 explained that the final of the five scenarios he analyzed reflected indicated rate changes identical to the
22 interim rate template submitted by State Farm.⁹³

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24 ⁸⁵ Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 147.

25 ⁸⁶ Exh. IRH-CWD-234; IRH-SFG-180 [Feb. 26, 2025 Transcript], p. 23:5–13.

26 ⁸⁷ IRH-CWD-253 [Armstrong Decl., Mar. 24, 2025], ¶ 6.

27 ⁸⁸ Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 140:10–142:2.

28 ⁸⁹ *Id.* at 142:17–25.

⁹⁰ IRH-CWD-253 [Armstrong Decl., Mar. 24, 2025], ¶ 6.

⁹¹ See IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 5.

⁹² Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 105–109.

⁹³ *Id.* at 104:10–19.

1 State Farm’s cross-examination of Mr. Armstrong attempted to cast doubt on his original
2 analysis by criticizing a number of actuarial selections that Mr. Armstrong made based on information
3 available to him, even though he explained the adjustments he made in scenarios two through five in his
4 April 7 Supplemental Declaration.⁹⁴

5 For example, Mr. Armstrong’s initially-selected loss development factor of 1.725 did not match
6 the figure required in the rate template to be used when a variance is not at issue.⁹⁵ However, Mr.
7 Armstrong explained during his cross examination that he “felt that the 1.793 was excessive based on
8 outsized values in the latest diagonal, and so I made an attempt to adjust those in my initial analysis,
9 however, I changed that in my subsequent analysis to be 1.793 consistent with what State Farm is using,
10 and that can be seen in Scenarios [2] and up from my supplemental declaration.”⁹⁶ Mr. Armstrong’s
11 April 7 Supplemental Declaration recognized that making such a change to his analysis would raise his
12 initial indication by a few percentage points,⁹⁷ but it had no effect on the rest of his analysis, which used
13 the same loss development factor used by State Farm.

14 Mr. Armstrong also explained in response to questioning on cross-examination that in his initial
15 rate indication, he had calculated the AIY trend factor using “the total amount of insurance years as
16 shown on Exhibit 9, Page 2, Column 2, and I should have used the average amount of insurance years
17 per exposure from Exhibit D.”⁹⁸ Mr. Armstrong again acknowledged that this change would raise his
18 initial maximum permitted indication to 7% as shown in scenario 3 of his April 7 Supplemental
19 Declaration,⁹⁹ but again, this change had no bearing on his ultimate conclusion that State Farm’s current
20 homeowners rates, based on its own preferred assumptions, cannot be shown to be plainly invalid
21 because they fall within the maximum and minimum permitted earned premium indications.

23 ⁹⁴ See IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 5.

24 ⁹⁵ *Id.* at 135:6–18.

25 ⁹⁶ *Id.* at 135:20–25.

26 ⁹⁷ See IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 10.

27 ⁹⁸ Apr. 9, 2025 Transcript at 139:21–24.

28 ⁹⁹ *Id.* at 139:25–140:7. Mr. Armstrong also noted in his supplemental declaration that while State Farm’s
selected 9.3% value for AIY trend is supportable, using such a factor developed using data only through
2023Q4 results in a mismatch between that factor and the 2025 catastrophe loss data used to develop the
CAT/AIY ratio that drives the catastrophe adjustment factor. (Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025,
¶ 11.)

1 In sum, Mr. Armstrong fully explained the methodologies and assumptions underlying each of
2 the five rate indication scenarios he presented in his April 7 Supplemental Declaration, and
3 acknowledged that the adjustments may have an effect on his initial rate indication, but, critically, his
4 ultimate conclusion remains unchanged: “The results are consistent: under each scenario, the current rate
5 falls within a lawful range.”¹⁰⁰ Despite State Farm’s attempted attacks on Mr. Armstrong’s credibility,
6 no State Farm or Department witness refuted this conclusion.

7 **VIII. Variance 6 Is Not Relevant to Whether the Interim Rates Should Be Approved**

8 At the hearing, the Department indicated on several occasions that it believed that Variance 6 is
9 at issue in these interim rate proceedings.¹⁰¹ This is flatly incorrect. Consumer Watchdog recognizes
10 that, in the underlying rate applications, State Farm has not yet abandoned its Variance 6 claims (though
11 it has expressed a desire not to rely on Variance 6 to justify its final rates). But these proceedings are not
12 about State Farm’s final rates—they are about its interim rate requests, which are explicitly not based on
13 Variance 6. Indeed, State Farm itself acknowledged as much, stating “[Variance 6 is] still part of State
14 Farm General’s rate application which will be analyzed during the full rate hearing. **But that’s not what**
15 **this hearing is about. This hearing is about the stipulated interim rates.**”¹⁰² Consumer Watchdog
16 concurs.

17 **IX. Uncertain Refunds Do Not Cure the Two-Way Stipulation’s Procedural or Substantive** 18 **Defects**

19 State Farm’s fundamental fairness argument relies heavily on its claim that even if the stipulated
20 interim rates “turn out to be too high,” refunds after the fact will cure any harm to consumers from being
21 charged excessive rates.¹⁰³ But refunds at some unknown future date after State Farm exhausts all its
22 legal remedies if it thinks the final rates ordered are too low will not fix the immediate harm to families
23 who must rearrange their budgets now, who might have to cut back on essentials to pay increased bills,
24 or may be forced to drop coverage altogether.¹⁰⁴ Refunds also will not help those families still struggling

25 ¹⁰⁰ See IRH-CWD-254 [Supp. Armstrong Decl., Apr. 7, 2025], ¶ 5.

26 ¹⁰¹ Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 32:10–21, 51:7–13.

27 ¹⁰² *Id.* at 168:10–13, emphasis added.

28 ¹⁰³ State Farm Brief in Support of Interim Rate, Apr. 2, 2025, p. 10.

¹⁰⁴ See Apr. 10, 2025 Transcript at 63:2–10 (CDI Chief Actuary Shaw admitted to this possibility of State Farm policyholders being forced to drop coverage if they could not afford the interim rate hikes).

1 to recover from the recent fires who need money in their pockets now, not a promise to be repaid later.
2 Although State Farm agrees to not challenge the Commissioner’s *authority* to order refunds, the two-
3 party stipulation includes language that would allow State Farm to seek and obtain a stay of any such
4 refund order in order to challenge the amount of any final rate and refund order in court,¹⁰⁵ including by
5 arguing that a higher rate should be approved resulting in no refunds. Even if State Farm lost that
6 challenge to the final rate order, refunds would likely be delayed for years during the pendency of the
7 litigation.¹⁰⁶ To be clear, State Farm is entitled to make its case in the noticed evidentiary hearing and
8 any subsequent legal challenge that it is entitled to rates higher than the proposed interim rates, but to
9 force policyholders to foot the bill in the interim is not fundamentally fair.

10 Consumer Watchdog has consistently maintained that the Commissioner has authority to grant
11 interim relief when existing rates are plainly invalid and may order an insurer to issue refunds to prevent
12 excessive charges from remaining in effect. (See *Calfarm, supra*, 48 Cal.3d at p. 824; *20th Century*,
13 *supra*, 8 Cal.4th at p. 245.) But refunds cannot be a substitute for meeting the substantive standard for
14 interim rate relief, and in this case where interim relief is sought based on a stipulation, refunds do not
15 make the stipulation fair or in the interests of justice.

16 CONCLUSION

17 State Farm hasn’t met its burden for approval of an interim rate, nor has it shown how the
18 proposed stipulation is fundamentally fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the interests of justice. But this
19 hearing is a waypoint, not the final step. Consumer Watchdog agrees with the CDI’s chief actuary that
20 more information and data are needed through a full rate hearing so that a determination can be made on
21 the appropriate rate based on a full record. State Farm can—and should—make its case fully in that
22 setting. But granting an unjustified interim increase now undermines Proposition 103 and hurts
23 California families. The Administrative Law Judge should deny the interim rate request and reject the
24 proposed stipulation in full. The parties should proceed to the evidentiary hearing noticed to commence
25

26
27 ¹⁰⁵ IRH-SFG-101-06, lines 22–23.

28 ¹⁰⁶ State Farm’s prior successful challenge to the Commissioner’s authority to order refunds was
adjudicated over the course of five years from 2016–2021. (*State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lara* (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 148.)

1 June 1, 2025, where their competing claims can be evaluated through the process Proposition 103
2 requires: open, transparent, and grounded in law.
3
4

5 Dated: April 23, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

6 **CONSUMER WATCHDOG**

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