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212223	In the Matter of the Rate Applications of STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,	File Nos. PA-2024-00011, PA-2024-00012, PA-2024-00013 STATE FARM GENERAL'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS IN LIMINE
24	Applicant.	
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THE DEPARTMENT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE WATKINS'S TESTIMONY

The California Department of Insurance ("CDI" or the "Department") requests to limit or

exclude testimony by State Farm General's expert, Nancy Watkins. The Department claims that

its request is necessary to protect confidential information and avoid a conflict of interest. Mot. at

1. State Farm General does not object to the Department's request that the ALJ "limit the in-

person testimony of Ms. Watkins to non-confidential matters." Mot. at 2. But the Department's

alternative request, "to exclude [Watkins'] testimony in its entirety," is premature, unnecessary to

protect confidentiality, and misunderstands the meaning of a "conflict of interest." Even worse,

the Department's motion threatens extreme prejudice to State Farm General because of possible

First, the Department's motion to exclude is premature. A motion is not ripe if it seeks to

conduct by Consumer Watchdog. The ALJ should deny the Department's request to exclude.

resolve a dispute that has not yet arisen. (See, e.g., O'Grady v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.

App. 4th 1423, 1453-54 [explaining that motion regarding discovery was premature "because no

other discovery had actually been undertaken"].) Courts decline to resolve unripe motions for the

resources, either because it ultimately proves unnecessary, or because it addresses the pertinent

issues at too abstract and hypothetical a level for sound resolution." (Id. at 1454.) That is the

it is near non-existent. As even the Department acknowledges, there is no indication that the

interim rate proceedings will implicate the information that is allegedly protected by Watkins'

Watkins' declaration and determined that "she has not disclosed any confidential data or work

contract with the Department. (Mot. at 2.) In fact, the Department concedes that it has reviewed

Here, the risk that Ms. Watkins will present improper testimony is not merely speculative,

same reason they dismiss unripe claims: Premature adjudication "could well waste court

precise risk that the Department's anticipatory motion presents here.

IS PREMATURE AND UNFOUNDED.

product." $(Id.)^1$ The Department offers no legal basis for preemptively excluding an expert based on testimony that she as expressly (and repeatedly) said that she will not provide.

Consumer Watchdog's reservation of rights to cross-examine Ms. Watkins regarding confidential information does not make the Department's motion ripe. According to the Department, Consumer Watchdog would not agree to refrain from cross-examining Watkins about Department-confidential information. (Mot. at 7.) But that does not mean that Consumer Watchdog will cross-examine Ms. Watkins on confidential information. Nor should it. As the Department agrees, nothing in Ms. Watkins' declaration implicates Department-confidential information and examining Ms. Watkins on potential confidential information unrelated to her testimony here would be inappropriate. The Department's conjecture that Consumer Watchdog may engage in an improper line of questioning is too speculative to warrant the extreme prejudice caused by excluding expert testimony mid-trial.

Second, excluding Watkins's testimony is unnecessary to protect the Department's confidential information. The Department's motion and supporting declaration are clear: Nothing in Ms. Watkins's declaration implicates the Department's confidential information. See infra at n.1. Indeed, the only real threat to the Department's confidential information appears to be Consumer Watchdog, who—for reasons unknown—insists on reserving the possibility that it may cross-examine Ms. Watkins on Department confidential information. (See Mot. at 7.)

The better remedy is to limit *Consumer Watchdog*'s conduct, not State Farm General's ability to present its case. Barring Consumer Watchdog from examining Ms. Watkins on confidential information poses no prejudice. Consumer Watchdog can ask Ms. Watkins about the entirety of her declaration without encroaching on confidential information. By contrast, barring Ms. Watkins from testifying on the eve of trial would be highly prejudicial, leaving State Farm

information"]; *id.* ["Ms. Watkins has asserted she does not intend to violate her contractual obligations"]; McKennedy Decl. ¶ 13 ["Ms. Watkins indicated she understood her contractual obligations and did not intend to violate them."].)

¹ (See also Mot. at 7 [Department acknowledging that Ms. Watkins "indicated that she understood her contractual obligations [of confidentiality] and did not intend to violate them."]; id. at 9 ["In the Department's view, Ms. Watkins' April 2, 2025 Declaration does not divulge confidential information"]; id. ["Ms. Watkins has asserted she does not intend to violate her contractual

General without any witness to rebut testimony provided by Consumer Watchdog's in-house actuary.

Third, excluding Ms. Watkins testimony is unnecessary to cure any cognizable conflict of interest. The Department offers a two-part test for assessing Ms. Watkins's involvement in this case, relying on caselaw involving (1) conflicted attorneys, or (2) expert witnesses who worked, or considered working for, adverse parties in the *same litigation*. (Mot. at 7-8 [citing Western Digital corp. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal. App. 4th 1471; In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal. App. 3d 72, 586].) That test has no application here, where an independent, third-party expert consulted for separate parties about separate issues on separate matters.

The Department's new view on conflicts law would have sweeping effects, limiting independent expert's ability to work on different issues for different parties in different matters. The problems with that approach are on full display here. The Department provides no explanation for how Ms. Watkins's prior consulting work for the Department on reinsurance and a new rate regulation creates an actual conflict. Ms. Watkins offers no testimony about reinsurance or that rate regulation. And the Department does not suggest that information Ms. Watkins had access to could have informed her opinions in this case.

Simply put, the Department's motion is premature and unfounded. State Farm General respectfully requests that the ALJ deny the Department's request to exclude Watkins' testimony in its entirety. State Farm General takes no position on the Department's request that the ALJ "admonish Ms. Watkins of her contractual responsibilities and obligations of confidentiality . . . [and] limit the in—person testimony of Ms. Watkins to non-confidential matters." Mot. at 2.

II. RESPONSE TO CONSUMER WATCHDOG'S MIL #1: EVIDENCE REGARDING STATE FARM GENERAL'S FINANCIAL CONDITION IS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE.

Consumer Watchdog's Motion in Limine #1 is effectively a request to scuttle the hearing by seeking to exclude "any evidence, argument, or reference to State Farm General Insurance Company's general financial condition, including but not limited to evidence, argument, or

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reference to issues concerning solvency, capital deterioration, credit ratings, or financial strength ratings." Consumer Watchdog's Motion in Limine No. 1 at 2. State Farm General respectfully requests that the ALJ deny the motion.

Consumer Watchdog knows well that the stipulation to the interim rate is not based on Variance 6 (as would be appropriate for a full rate hearing *if* Variance 6 were invoked), but rather it is subject to the test of the stipulation being "fundamentally fair, adequate, reasonable and in the interests of justice" amid emergency conditions.

The two-way stipulation includes State Farm General's statement that "its financial strength rating was downgraded in 2024" and "that some of Applicant's customers might have to find other insurance if further downgrades were to happen." The stipulation also includes State Farm General's representation that its "financial projections show a continued decline in the surplus it needs to support the writing of its homeowners lines of insurance in California." (Stipulation to Interim Rate Subject to Refunds With Interest Pending A Final Determination of the Legality of the Rate ["Stipulation"] at 5.) The stipulation further states, moreover, that "the Department agrees that Applicant has made a preliminary showing that it may be able to demonstrate, after a full rate hearing, that it may be entitled to a rate increase," in part due to "Applicant's concerning financial condition" and "the preliminary information provided by Applicant regarding the devastating impacts of the Palisades/Eaton Fires on Applicant's financial condition." (*Id.*)

The Commissioner thus instructed the ALJ to consider the issues presented by that showing, which includes argument and evidence presented by State Farm General during this interim rate process. The David Appel and Bryon Ehrhart testimony—provided by declaration and soon, at the hearing—will directly address these issues. Indeed, the parties (including Consumer Watchdog) have already presented extensive analysis addressing these issues that should be heard and considered by the ALJ, in addition to the testimony at the hearing. For example, CDI's actuary stated that she performed a "holistic assessment of the Applicant's current financial condition and the overall health of the California homeowners insurance marketplace," in

of Proposition 103 and should be taken into account in the ALJ's decision whether to recommend that the Commissioner grant an interim rate.

III. RESPONSE TO CONSUMER WATCHDOG MIL #2: EVIDENCE REGARDING THE SUPPLEMENTAL STIPULATION IS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE.

Consumer Watchdog asks the ALJ to exclude "from the April 8, 2025 interim rate hearing any evidence, argument, or reference to the Supplement to February 7, 2025 Stipulation to Interim Rate Subject to Refunds With Interest Pending a Final Determination of Legality of the Rate submitted on April 4, 2025." (Consumer Watchdog's Notice Of and Motion In Limine No 2. to Exclude Evidence Regarding the Supplement to the February 7, 2025 Stipulation at 1.) Consumer Watchdog claims that the supplemental stipulation was "untimely filed," that there are no "declarations in support of the April 4 Supplement," and that "[i]ntroduction of evidence concerning the untimely filed and unsupported April 4 Supplement would be unfair and unduly prejudicial." (*Id.*) State Farm General Respectfully requests that the ALJ deny Consumer Watchdog's motion in limine.

State Farm General submits that the supplemental stipulation is not untimely, and instead was the direct result of State Farm General and CDI diligently following the Commissioner's instructions. The Commissioner's order setting this interim rate hearing expressly instructs the ALJ to consider "such additional correspondence, evidence and argument provided at the hearing," including with respect to the "the Commissioner's subsequent proposal to the parties." (Interim Rate Order at 2]. The supplemental stipulation is the result of CDI and State Farm General's additional discussions with respect to the Commissioner's proposal that State Farm General obtain a loan from State Farm Mutual and pause non-renewals. (*See* State of California Department of Insurance, Closed Meeting Transcript, March 11, 2025, IRH-SFG-159-05 at 6-6:34

["I would like State Farm to obtain a loan or capital infusion from State Farm Mutual...."]; *id.* at 9:49-10:20 [discussing request to "suspend non-renewals"].)

In the supplemental stipulation, State Farm General agreed "that if and when the Commissioner enters an order approving the interim rates" set forth in the supplemental stipulation, State Farm General "shall obtain a surplus note of \$400 million from State Farm Mutual." (Supplemental to February 7, 2025 Stipulation to Interim Rate Subject to Refunds with Interest Pending a Final Determination of the Legality of the Rate at 3 ["Supplemental Stipulation"].) In addition, in recognition of State Farm General's position that "it would be contrary to prudent management of the company and fiscally irresponsible to agree and stipulate to cease its currently implemented and ongoing nonrenewal program," State Farm General and CDI agreed to decrease "the requested interim rate in the Homeowners Non-Tenant HO-3 line from 21.8% to 17.0%." (*Id.* at 3.) The supplemental stipulation is thus highly relevant to this interim rate proceeding, because it represents State Farm General and CDI's negotiations to address the Commissioner's subsequent proposal to the parties.

State Farm General acknowledges that the ALJ requested the supplemental stipulation by April 2, 2025. State Farm General submits that exigent circumstances prevented the submission of a stipulation prior to April 4, 2025. Vanessa Wells, the lead attorney for State Farm General, negotiated the supplemental stipulation on behalf of State Farm General. Vanessa's mother tragically suffered a stroke last week, and Vanessa was unable to further the negotiating process because she was in the hospital assisting her mother, who subsequently passed away on Sunday. State Farm General and CDI worked diligently on the supplemental stipulation, but were not able to reach agreement until April 4, 2025 in significant part due to Vanessa's absence. Although State Farm General and CDI worked as swiftly as possible, they were unable to reach agreement on the supplemental stipulation prior to April 4, 2025.

Consumer Watchdog complains that there are no declarations to support the supplemental stipulation, but that is wrong. CDI filed a declaration on April 2, 2024, directly supporting its proposal for a \$400 million surplus note from State Farm Mutual and a 17% interim rate increase

for State Farm General's homeowner's line. (*See* Shaw Declaration at 8]. The declarations filed by State Farm General also directly support the supplemental stipulation, because they explain why a higher interim rate is warranted.

Consumer Watchdog claims prejudice, but CDI filed its declaration on April 2, 2025 explaining why a 17% interim rate increase for the homeowner's line, coupled with a \$400 million surplus note, "will effect a substantial improvement to Applicant's financial condition." (*Id.*) State Farm General filed its declarations on April 2, 2025, which likewise support the supplemental stipulation. Consumer Watchdog has thus had a sufficient opportunity to review and respond to the declarations supporting the supplemental stipulation, and it will have a further opportunity to do so at the interim rate hearing. (*See Barclay Hollander Corp. v. California Reg'l Water Quality Control Bd.* (2019) 38 Cal. App. 5th 479, 511 [finding no due process violation where agency gave party "several opportunities . . . to address the entire range of issues presented in the proceeding before it"]); (*Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States* (9th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3d 708, 717 [similar].)

It is unclear, moreover, how Consumer Watchdog is prejudiced by an agreement by State Farm General and CDI that is closer to Consumer Watchdog's position. Consumer Watchdog has repeatedly advocated for State Farm Mutual to contribute capital to State Farm General, and Consumer Watchdog claims that a 22% interim rate increase for the homeowner's line is too high. (CW Objections at 10, 17-18.) There is no prejudice to Consumer Watchdog in these circumstances. Indeed, under 10 CCR § 2656.1, the ALJ has the authority to "hold a hearing" within 10 business days of a party's objection to a "stipulation." That is exactly what is occurring here—the ALJ is holding a hearing that encompasses the supplemental stipulation within 10 business days of Consumer Watchdog's objections to that supplemental stipulation.

In short, the ALJ should deny the motion in limine. The purpose of this interim rate hearing is to decide how best to address State Farm General's declining financial condition and the risk of an imminent ratings downgrade, taking into account the Los Angeles wildfires. The Commissioner instructed State Farm General and CDI to continue to discuss and address that issue, and State Farm General and CDI were able to reach a supplemental stipulation. The ALJ should provide a

1	recommendation to the Commissioner on whether the supplemental stipulation should be adopted,			
2	consistent with the Commissioner's order setting this interim rate proceeding.			
3	III.	CONCLUSION		
4		For the foregoing reasons, State Farm General respectfully requests that the ALJ deny	the	
5	Department's Motion To Limit Testimony Of, Or In The Alternative Exclude, State Farm			
6	General's Retained Expert Witness Nancy Watkins; deny Consumer Watchdog's Motion To			
7	Exclude Evidence Regarding State Farm's General Financial Condition; and deny Consumer			
8	Watchdog's Motion To Exclude Evidence Regarding The Supplement To The February 7, 2025			
9	Stipulation. State Farm General reserves the right to verbally address Consumer Watchdog's			
10	Motion To Exclude Evidence Regarding RBC Calculations at the April 8 hearing.			
11				
12	Dated	d: April 8, 2025		
13		Respectfully submitted,		
14				
15		HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP		
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