	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Donald W. Henry, Receiver SUPERIOR COURT OF T	O FILED JUN 1 4 1995 JOHN A. CLARKE, CLERK C × CLIME BY C. COLEMAN, DEPUTY HE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Y OF LOS ANGELES
10	FOR THE COUNT	I OF LOS ANGELES
11	DONALD W. HENRY, RECEIVER,)	Case No. 8(190715
12	Plaintiff,	Case No. BC129715 COMPLAINT FOR:
13	vs.	1. FRAUD AND DECEIT;
14		2. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY;
15		3. AIDING AND ABETTING BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY;
16	C. CHRISTOPHER COX, an) individual; GARY MENDOZA,) an individual; and DOES)	 NEGLIGENT OMISSIONS; NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION; NEGLIGENCE; AND
17	1 through 100, inclusive,	7. PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE
18	Defendants.	
19	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
20		, appointed by Order of the United
21		District, on July 28, 1994, as
22	•) of BMF Mortgage Pools, BMF
23 24		nvestment Fund, BMF XXIII, VestCorp
24		meriSpec, Inc. ("AmeriSpec"), First
26		Inc. ("FDFS") Outpatient Surgery
27	("SCM"), Anaheim Surgery Cente:	. CC .#. To IC
28		ers, Ltd. ("MNP") Mitchell North,
		Jack, (Mar) A MICCHEII NOTCH,
	· ·	

1 Inc. ("Mitchell North"), and their respective subsidiaries, 2 affiliates, and related partnerships, among others, collectively 3 referred to as the "Receivership Entities", alleges as follows: 4 5 I. 6 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND FACTS 7 Α. BACKGROUND 8 In July 1994, the United States Attorney for the Central 1. 9 District of California charged William Edward Cooper ("Cooper"), Robert Ernest Lindley ("Lindley") and Valerie Jensen ("Jensen") with 10 11 two counts of mail fraud. On August 2, 1994, all three entered 12 guilty pleas to this criminal Information. 13 2. This brought to a conclusion an investment trust deed fraud

13 2. This brought to a conclusion an investment trust deed fraud 14 scheme that resulted in thousands of investors losing over \$130 15 million. This action relates to a part of that scheme which involved 16 the sale of limited partnership trust deed interests in two 17 investments which have become commonly known as Bank Mortgage Fund 18 No. 1 ("BMF1") and BMF Mortgage Income Fund ("BMF 100") which are 19 Receivership Entities.

3. The earliest plaintiff could have reasonably discovered the
fraud was July 28, 1994, the date plaintiff was appointed Receiver of
the Receivership Entities.

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B. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. Many of the acts, transactions and conduct constituting violations of law occurred in Los Angeles County, including the dissemination of advertisements and correspondence and telephone calls, containing misleading, deceptive, false and/or fraudulent information and non-disclosed material facts. Defendants did

business in Los Angeles County and their principal place of business
 in California is located in Los Angeles County. Plaintiff's
 principal place of business is located in Los Angeles County.

II.

IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES

5. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the Receivership Entities who have been damaged by defendants, and each of them.

A. FIRST PENSION CORPORATION

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9 First Pension Corporation ("FPC"), a California corporation 6. formed in 1980 and located in Irvine, California, was a pension 10 administrator. FPC had approximately 8,000 clients and \$350 million 11 in client assets under its control. It was 100% owned by First 12 13 Diversified Financial Services ("FDFS"), which, in turn, is owned by Cooper, Lindley and Jensen. On April 22, 1994, FPC filed a Chapter 14 15 7 bankruptcy petition in the U.S. District Court, Central District of 16 California, Santa Ana, Case No. SA94-14145 JB, and on April 25, 1994, the Office of the United States Trustee appointed a trustee, James 17 18 Joseph, to liquidate FPC's assets.

19 7. Cooper was a general partner of most of the limited 20 partnerships offered through VestCorp, a broker-dealer, and was partial owner of FDFS, which he co-owned with Lindley and Jensen. 21 22 Cooper, during all relevant times, was president of Diversified Financial Services ("DFS"), Equity Realty Advisors, Inc. ("ERA") and 23 United Securities Equities, each of which acted as a general partner 24 for some of the limited partnerships. On April 5, 1994, Cooper 25 became First Pension's president, replacing Jensen. 26 During all 27 relevant times, Cooper was also a shareholder of Summit Trust 28 Services, Inc. ("Summit"), FPC's most recent custodian, and he was

president of Ernest-Edwards & Associates, Inc. ("Ernest-Edwards"), a 1 purported broker-dealer which dealt with FPC.

3 8. In 1984, Cooper was disciplined by state regulators after 4 nearly \$600,000 was diverted from a trust fund he was supervising at 5 L.B. Mortgage Servicing Co., according to records of the California 6 Department of Real Estate. As a direct consequence of such 7 diversion, Cooper's real estate license was restricted for negligence 8 and failing to supervise the company.

9 9. Jensen was a partial owner of FDFS and VestCorp. She 10 served as VestCorp's Chief Executive Officer from approximately 1986 11 through July 1992, the vice-president of FPC from approximately 1980 to 1982, and the president of FPC from 1982 to April 1994. 12 She also 13 served as secretary of Summit and as a member of its Board of 14 Directors along with Judith Hanson, Lindley and Kenneth Lyon, 15 president of Summit.

16 Lindley was the president of BMF Management, Inc., a 10. 17 general partner of some of the limited partnerships offered through Lindley was a partial owner of FDFS with Cooper and 18 VestCorp. 19 Jensen, the treasurer and secretary of VestCorp, Chief Financial 20 Officer and treasurer of DFS, a director of Summit, the treasurer of 21 Ernest-Edwards and the chairman of the board of NPB Service, the 22 company that services certain of BMF100's Trust Deed Loans for a monthly fee. 23

24 11. Defendant Latham & Watkins ("Latham"), a professional law corporation law, served as corporate counsel, assisted in drafting 25 26 and provided the legal opinion to the April 30, 1987, prospectus of 27 BMF100.

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Defendant Gary Mendoza ("Mendoza"), an individual, was at 12.

the relevant time, an attorney at Latham & Watkins who acted as
 corporate counsel to the FPC entities, Receivership Entities, and
 participated in drafting the April 30, 1987, BMF 100 prospectus.

13. Defendant John R. Stahr ("Stahr"), an individual, was at
the relevant time, an attorney at Latham & Watkins who acted as
corporate counsel to the FPC entities and participated in drafting
the April 30, 1987, BMF 100 prospectus. Stahr also prepared the SEC
filings for BMF 100.

9 14. Defendant C. Christopher Cox ("Cox"), an individual, was at
10 the relevant time, an attorney at Latham & Watkins who acted as
11 corporate counsel to First Pension.

12 B. DOE DEFENDANTS

13 15. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of
14 those defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, and
15 therefore sue those defendants by such fictitious names.

16 16. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that 17 each of the fictitiously named defendants herein are in some manner 18 liable and responsible to Plaintiff for the damages suffered by 19 Plaintiff as alleged herein.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that 20 17. at all times herein mentioned, defendants, and each of them, 21 including all Doe Defendants, alternatively were and are agents, 22 23 employees, partners, joint venturers, co-conspirators and/or aiders 24 and abettors of each other and were acting within the course and 25 scope of the agency, employment, partnership, joint venture, 26 conspiracy or assistance with the consent and permission, express and 27 implied, and ratification of each other's conduct.

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18. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true

names and capacities when ascertained.

III.

PRIMARY WRONG

5 A. CRIMINAL INFORMATION

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19. The criminal Information states in relevant part:

7 1. From approximately 1982, through and including April 8 1994, WILLIAM EDWARD COOPER ("COOPER"), ROBERT ERNEST LINDLEY 9 ("LINDLEY") and VALERIE JENSEN ("JENSEN"), together with 10 other individuals and entities known and unknown to the 11 United States Attorney, devised, intended to devise, and carried out a scheme to defraud and to obtain money from 12 13 victims of the scheme by means of false and fraudulent 14 pretenses, representations and promises.

15 2. As described in this Information, during the period 16 of the scheme to defraud, COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and 17 their co-schemers operated several related business entities 18 which purported to offer to clients a variety of financial 19 services. including limited but not to pension 20 administration, investments in real estate and certificates 21 of deposit.

3. In general, the scheme enabled COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-schemers to:

a. Hide mounting losses in the real estate investments from investors and pension clients;

b. Divert money from the real estate investments and from cash accounts held for pension clients in order to pay their own salaries, make payroll for their employees,

most operating expenses of the entities, cover losses and make distributions to prior investors; and

c. Use diverted money to invest in other entities in an effort to cover the shortfalls created by the scheme to defraud.

4. As the scheme began to unravel in March and April 1994, COOPER and LINDLEY and certain other co-schemers diverted investor checks and forged other checks for their own personal use and benefit.

5. As is described in this Information, the scheme to defraud resulted in a shortfall of approximately \$121.5 million in client accounts held through entities controlled by COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN. These losses included approximately \$66.7 million invested by clients of these entities, and the remainder was interest purportedly accrued in client accounts during the course of the scheme.

II. <u>THE ENTITIES</u>

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6. At all times relevant to this Information (unless otherwise noted):

20 Continental Home Loan ("Continental") was a а. loan broker operating in Orange County, California from at 21 least 1980. Continental brokered risky, "hard money loans" . 22 to individuals who were unable to obtain loans from more 23 conventional financial institutions due to credit problems. 24 These loans were secured by junior trust deeds of second or 25 26 lower priority on real estate, and Continental looked to the amount of equity in the real estate, as opposed to the 27 28 credit-worthiness of the borrower, for ultimate repayment of

the loan.

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b. Cooper was owner and operator of Continental. LINDLEY was chief financial officer of Continental.

c. First Pension, Inc. ("First Pension") was a pension fund administrator operating in Orange County, California from at least 1980. First Pension administered Individual Retirement Accounts ("IRAs") and Keough plan accounts (retirement accounts for the self-employed) for individuals, as well as pension plans for small employers. First Pension deducted a fee from each client account to pay for services rendered.

d. From approximately 1980 through December 1987,
JENSEN was vice-president of First Pension. In January 1988,
JENSEN was promoted to president of First Pension, and served
in that position until her resignation on April 5, 1994.

16 Vestcorp of California ("Vestcorp") was a e. 17 registered investment advisor which functioned as investment 18 advisor to First Pension clients from approximately 1980 19 through approximately 1983. In January 1983, COOPER, LINDLEY 20 and JENSEN and their co-schemers decided to discontinue 21 Vestcorp as a registered investment advisor and opened 22 Vestcorp Securities, Inc. ("Vestcorp Securities") as а 23 registered broker-dealer for the purpose of marketing real estate and other investments. 24

f. From approximately 1980 until approximately 1983, First Pension clients were requested to appoint Vestcorp as their investment advisor, and had the option, on the advice of Vestcorp, of investing either in certificates

of deposit, interests in junior trust deeds sold to First Pension investors by Continental or other hard money lenders, or in real estate syndications. Beginning in 1983, First Pension clients "self-directed" their pension funds either to the investments previously available to them or into stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or other types of investments.

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7 In approximately 1987, COOPER, LINDLEY and α. 8 JENSEN formed a new entity, First Diversified Financial Services ("First Diversified") as a holding company for First Pension, Vestcorp Securities and other entities. COOPER. LINDLEY and JENSEN each owned a one-third interest in First Diversified. First Diversified provided a variety of functions for First Pension, Vestcorp Securities and other related entities, including but not limited to marketing, payroll, accounting, data processing and mailroom services.

16 h. From approximately 1980 through and including 17 1993, First Pension maintained custodial cash accounts at 18 several successive southern California financial 19 institutions. These accounts purportedly contained the 20 aggregate amount of cash held by First Pension for its 21 First Pension held cash for its clients because clients. 22 each client was required to maintain at least \$50 cash in his 23 or her account at all times, and also because First Pension 24 needed an account in which to keep the portion of the 25 client's funds which remained undesignated for investment by 26 the client. Pursuant to First Pension's agreements with 27 these financial institutions, First Pension exercised 28 exclusive control over the funds deposited in the custodial

cash accounts.

i. In or about February 1993 COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN formed a new entity, Summit Trust Services, Inc. ("Summit Trust"), which was chartered as a trust company under the laws of the state of Colorado. Effective January 1, 1994, Summit Trust became the new custodian for First Pension's clients' undesignated cash.

III. <u>THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD</u>

9 7. COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-schemers
 10 carried out the scheme to defraud as follows:

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A. The Bank Mortgage Funds

12 8. In approximately late 1981, many of the trust deeds 13 sold to First Pension clients by Continental became nonperforming due to falling real estate values and borrower 14 15 defaults. In approximately 1982, in order to hide the losses 16 on non-performing trust deeds from First Pension investors, 17 COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-schemers agreed to 18 pool all First Pension trust deeds into an entity called the 19 Bank Mortgage Fund One ("BMF1"). All First Pension clients. 20 including those with interests in non-performing trust deeds, 21 received a pro rata share in BMF1 based on the face amount of 22 their initial investment. In addition, quarterly statements 23 sent to First Pension clients with investments in BMF1 24 reflected both the client's principal investment and the 25 accrual of both the client's principal investment and the accrual of interest, even though some of the trust deeds in 26 27 BMF1 were not current, performing loans.

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9. Because of the undisclosed losses in the trust

deeds, there was a shortfall in BMF1 from the beginning. The shortfall grew as a result of other undisclosed losses in trust deeds during the period from 1981 through 1983, and also as a result of diversions of newly invested funds in order to cover operating losses at First Pension, Continental and related entities. However, these losses were never disclosed to First Pension clients, who continued to receive statements indicating that interest was purportedly accruing in their investment in BMF1.

10 As of March 31, 1994, the shortfall in BMF1 had 10. 11 grown to approximately \$26.6 million. This shortfall 12 included approximately \$6.7 million in investor funds which had been paid into and diverted from BMF1, and approximately 13 14 \$19.9 million in interest which had purportedly accumulated 15 in investors' accounts and which was reflected on investors' 16 statements.

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The Mini-Funds Β.

18 In approximately 1983, COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN 11. 19 and their co-schemers agreed to offer a new form of real 20 estate investment to First Pension clients and others. The 21 "mini-funds" were limited partnerships formed for the 22 ostensible purposes of investing in junior trust deeds. 23 These mini-funds purportedly qualified for exemption from 24 registration under applicable federal and state securities 25 laws because they contained 35 or fewer investors. By March 26 31, 1994, approximately 190 of these mini-funds had been offered and sold to First Pension clients and others, of 28 which approximately 60 had been liquidated and the investors

paid off.

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12. From approximately 1986 and on, no trust deeds were purchased with the funds raised from the mini-fund solicitations. From the beginning, COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-schemers used the mini-funds as a source of operating revenue for their various business entities, including existing entities and new entities. Eventually, funds from later mini-funds were used to pay distributions to investors in, and to liquidate, earlier mini-funds.

13. COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-schemers actively concealed the lack of trust deeds in the mini-funds by engaging in the following acts, among others:

13 In approximately 1990, the president а. of 14 VESTCORP Securities confronted COOPER that he was unable to 15 verify the existence of any trust deeds held by any of the 16 mini-funds. In order to prevent further suspicions on the 17 part of the president of VESTCORP and other employees, 18 COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-schemers hired an 19 actress to play the part of an auditor for the Department of 20 Corporations for the State of California ("DOC"). JENSEN 21 provided to COOPER, who in turn provided the actress, with a 22 fictitious Department of Corporations business card to 23 present to VESTCORP. The actress sat in a conference room at 24 First Diversified and pretended to review mini-fund files for 25 approximately three weeks. COOPER and LINDLEY then drafted 26 a letter on bogus Department of Corporations stationary which 27 defendant COOPER presented to the president of VESTCORP 28 Securities. The letter stated that, with some minor

discrepancies, the audited mini-funds files were in order.

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b. In or about January 1993, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation served a federal grand jury subpoena on VESTCORP Securities calling for the production of all records, including but not limited to evidence of underlying assets, for certain selected minifunds. In response to the subpoena, COOPER, LINDLEY and a co-schemer created false and fraudulent trust deeds and other documents that were produced to a federal grand jury in response to the subpoena.

11 14. As of March 31, 1994, the shortfall in the existing 12 130 mini-funds had grown to approximately \$68.9 million. 13 This shortfall included approximately \$37 million which 14 investors had paid into the mini-funds, and approximately 15 \$31.9 million in interest which had purportedly accumulated 16 in clients' accounts and which was reflected on their 17 statements.

18 C. <u>Diversions From First Pension's Custodial Cash</u> 19 <u>Account</u>

Beginning in approximately 1988, COOPER, LINDLEY 20 15. and JENSEN and their co-schemers diverted cash from First 21 22 Pension's custodial cash accounts in order to pay for 23 operating expenses, start new business entities, and make distributions from and liquidate maturing mini-funds. 24 TO25 accomplish these diversions, defendants COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-schemers employed the following false and 26 27 fraudulent methods, among others:

a. COOPER and LINDLEY created a Nevada corporation

purportedly located in Arizona called Ernest Edwards & Associates, and along with JENSEN diverted approximately \$7 million from First Pension's custodial cash account to a bank account established in Ernest Edwards' name in Phoenix, Arizona. Ernest Edwards had no legitimate business purpose, and served solely as a conduit for COOPER and LINDLEY and their co-schemers to divert investor money.

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8 COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their cob. 9 schemers created false and fraudulent client accounts with accompanying false and fraudulent documentation. 10 By 11 manipulating the computer system, JENSEN would create false 12 balances in these non-existent client accounts. COOPER. LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-schemers would then divert 13 funds for other purposes from these accounts by purportedly 14 15 making investments in non-existent trust deeds on behalf of 16 these fictitious clients. Using this technique, and their co-schemers diverted approximately \$4.3 million. 17

c. COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their coschemers diverted approximately \$4.4 million from the custodial cash account to make retirement distributions to clients of First Pension who had invested in non-existent trust deeds and certificates of deposit.

d. COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their coschemers diverted approximately \$540,000 in ostensible "service fees" from the custodial cash account to First Pension's general business account; in truth and in fact, no services were ever rendered for these "fees."

e. COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN and their co-

schemers diverted approximately \$928,000 from the custodial cash account for investment in fictitious certificates of deposits.

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16. In or about January 1994, First Pension transferred control of the custodial cash account to Summit Trust. At that time, due to the scheme to defraud, the custodial cash account contained only \$8 million, and not \$31 million as reflected on the books of First Pension. In order to explain the shortfall, JENSEN engaged in the following actions, among others:

a. JENSEN falsely represented to Summit Trust that
 approximately \$23 million had been invested in bank
 certificates of deposit through Ernest Edwards.

b. JENSEN created a fictitious file reflecting
correspondence between herself and Ernest Edwards concerning
the investment of the \$23 million in certificates of deposit.

17 In truth and in fact, as JENSEN well knew, c. 18 approximately \$23 million was missing from the custodial cash 19 account due to the diversions from that account by herself 20 co-schemers, and not invested in and her was bank 21 certificates of deposit. JENSEN also knew that the 22 approximately \$7 million actually sent to Ernest Edwards had 23 not been invested in bank certificates of deposit, but 24 instead had been diverted to further the scheme to defraud as 25 described in this Complaint.

26 17. As of March 31, 1994, therefore, the custodial cash
27 account held by Summit for the benefit of First Pension
28 customers should have contained approximately \$31 million.

In truth and in fact, the shortfall in First Pension's custodial cash accounts was approximately \$23 million, including approximately \$3 million in interest which should have been earned but which was lost due to the diversions.

IV. <u>SUMMARY OF LOSSES</u>

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18. The following table summarize the approximate outof-pocket losses suffered by investors, and the approximate shortfalls in investor accounts due to investor losses and interest accrued in investor accounts, resulting from the scheme to defraud described in this Complaint:

Summit Trus	t . \$ 3.0 i	million	\$ 3.0 million	xx	
Custodial Ca	ish	\$20.0 million	\$23.0 million	xx	-
Mini-Funds		\$37.0 million	\$68.9 million	xx	
BMF1		\$ 6.7 million	\$26.6 million	xx	
<u>ENTITY</u>	<u>OUT-</u>	<u>OF-POCKET LOSS</u>	<u>SHORTFALL</u>	<u>PARAGRAPI</u>	H

TOTALS \$66.7 million

\$121.5 million

V. EXECUTION OF THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

COUNTS ONE AND TWO

(18 U.S.C. § 1341)

19. On or about the dates set forth below, within the Central District of California and elsewhere, defendants COOPER, LINDLEY and JENSEN, having devised, intended to devise, and carried out a scheme to defraud and to obtain money from victims of the scheme by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Information,

for the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud, knowingly and willfully caused to be placed in an authorized depository for mail matter and delivered by the United States Postal . Service, according to the directions.

6 B. BMF MORTGAGE INCOME FUND

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7 20. BMF100 was an investment fund formed by BMF Management,
8 Inc. (the "Fund Manager") and organized under the laws of the State
9 of California as a limited partnership.

10 21. Title of security in BMF100 was through Mortgage Income
11 Fund Participation Interests (the "Participation Interests"), a
12 limited partnership interest in BMF100.

Each Participation Interest represented limited 13 22. а partnership interest in BMF100 which would hold a pool of trust deed 14 loans and other assets. A Participation Interest would be 15 denominated in a dollar amount initially equal to the exchange value 16 of any trust deed loan contributed by an investor in exchange for 17 Participation Interests, as determined by applying a valuation 18 technique as described in the prospectus of the BMF100 offering. 19 Each participant was a limited partner in BMF100. 20

Substantially all of the principal payments received by 21 23. BMF100 on trust deed loans, including prepayments and the proceeds 22 23 from the sale of loans, net of BMF100 expenses, was to be reinvested in additional trust deed loans or, at the election of a participant 24 in BMF100, passed through quarterly. Prior to such reinvestment or 25 distribution, principal payments received by the Fund, net of Fund 26 27 expenses, was to be reinvested in short-term interest-bearing 28 investments.

1 BMF100 was to consist entirely of (1) fixed rate, level 24. 2 installment, or variable rate trust deed loans that provide for the 3 full amortization of principal, (2) fixed or variable rate trust 4 deed loans that provide for partial amortization of principal with 5 the unpaid balance of the principal due at maturity, (3) fixed or 6 variable rate, interest-only trust deed loans with the full amount 7 of the principal due at maturity, (4) cash and short-term interest-8 bearing investments held by BMF100 pending distribution to 9 participants or investment in trust deed loans, (5) any real 10 property acquired by reason of non-judicial or judicial foreclosure of a trust deed loan, (6) a liquidity reserve, not to exceed three 11 12 percent (3%) of total fund assets, comprised of short-term interest-13 bearing investments, and (7) a collectability reserve, not to exceed 1% of total fund assets, comprised of short-term interest-bearing 14 15 investments.

16 The majority of the trust deed loans were to be secured 25. by a second trust deed on Southern California residential real 17 The remaining trust deed loans were to be secured by 18 property. 19 first or third trust deeds on such property. A limited number of trust deed loans were to be secured by a trust deed on commercial 20 property. Each trust deed loan was to meet the applicable standards 21 22 set forth in the prospectus for BMF100.

23 26. The total of BMF100's original investment in any trust 24 deed loan together with the loan balances on senior trust deeds in 25 existence at the time of the fund's investment was not to exceed 26 eighty percent (80%) of the appraised value of the relevant property 27 at the time such trust deed loan originated.

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27. The prospectus for BMF100 stated that it was anticipated

that former investment advisory clients of Pension Asset Management 1 2 would be exchanging up to approximately \$2,164,000 of trust deed loans presently owned by them for Participation Interests. 3 These 4 as disclosed by the prospectus, was exchanges, expected to 5 constitute a substantial portion of the initial trust deed loans in BMF100. 6

IV.

DEFENDANTS UNLAWFUL CONDUCT

9 A. LATHAM & WATKINS

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10 28. Defendant Latham & Watkins unlawfully participated directly and indirectly in the scheme in two basic ways. First, 11 Latham & Watkins made a series of false and misleading statements 12 to the California Department of Corporations ("DOC") and the United 13 States Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC") in connection with 14 15 the BMF100 application for qualification filed with the DOC and its registration statement filed with the SEC. Second, Latham & Watkins 16 prepared a prospectus used in connection with the sale of securities 17 issued by BMF100 which omitted material facts and misstated material 18 The unlawful conduct of defendant Latham & Watkins resulted 19 facts. in an excess of a \$2 million loss in BMF100 and additional losses 20 21 to BMF1.

Defendant Latham & Watkins began representing VestCorp of 22 29. California beginning in March 1984 when it received a \$10,000 23 retainer. VestCorp is a receivership entity. Their representation 24 involved legal services rendered in connection with pass through 25 mortgage loan pool matters, according to a billing issued by 26 defendant Latham & Watkins dated March 31, 1984. The billing 27 partner was defendant John R. Stahr. By July 1984, defendant Latham 28

& Watkins had billed over \$2,950.00 for services rendered since
 April 1, 1984, in connection with mortgage pool matters, according
 to a July 1984 billing statement issued by defendant Latham &
 Watkins to VestCorp of California.

5 By August 31, 1984, defendant Latham & Watkins had 30. performed research and analysis of ERISA and the Internal Revenue 6 Code relating to prohibited transactions and fiduciary duties 7 issues, according to a September 1984 billing statement issued by 8 defendant Latham & Watkins to VestCorp of California. By August 9 1984, defendant Latham & Watkins had done research and planning for 10 revising the mortgage pools to give them the effect of a partnership 11 structure and had analyzed proposals for the ownership of 12 VestCorp/Providence/and First Pension, according to a September 1984 13 billing statement issued by defendant Latham & Watkins to VestCorp 14 of California. 15

In January 1988, defendant Latham & Watkins billed Pension
Asset Management Company ("PAM"), a receivership entity, \$7,075.00;
for February 1988, \$1650.00; for March, \$6,000.00; for April,
\$9500.00; and for May 1988, defendant Latham & Watkins billed PAM
\$1525.00 for legal services rendered in connection with the BMF100
offering.

32. By July 1986 Vest-Corp had an unpaid bill of \$50,751.86.
In addition, and although plaintiffs do not have the billings for
1987, the May 1988 billing issued by defendant Latham & Watkins to
PAM showed a balance due from previous billings of \$81,880.69.

33. The following charts illustrate the monthly billings and
the accumulated balance due from previous billings:

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VESTCORP BILLINGS

1	Company	Billing Date	Amount Past Due	Monthly Fees	Monthly Cost	s Amount Due
2	Vest-Corp	3/31/84	\$900.00	\$525.00		\$1,425.00
3	Vest-Corp Vest-Corp	4/1/84 8/31/84	\$2,9 50.00 \$2,963.4 0	\$24,150.00	\$13.40 \$0.00	\$2,963.40 \$25,538.40
	Vest-Corp	9/30/84	\$27,113.40	\$9,000.00 \$18,500.00	\$236.57 \$268.03	\$36,349.97 \$38,543.00
4	Vest-Corp Vest-Corp	10/31/84 11/30/84	\$19,774.97 \$38,543.00	\$4,250.00	\$479.79	\$43,272.79
5	Vest-Corp	12/31/84	\$4,729.79	\$1,900.00 \$13,500.00	\$224.06 \$91.81	\$6,853.85 \$20,445.66
6	Vest-Corp Vest-Corp	1/31/85 2/28/85	\$6,853.85 \$20,445.66	\$5,600.00	\$956.05	\$27,001.71
_	Vest-Corp	3/31/85	\$27,001.71	\$150.00 \$1,500.00	\$408.31 \$143.08	\$27,5 60.02 \$11,644.79
7	Vest-Corp Vest-Corp	4/30/85 5/31/85	\$10,001.71 \$1,643.08	\$1,5 00.00 \$1,9 00.00	\$143.08 \$34.44	\$3,577.52
8	Vest-Corp	6/30/85	\$3,577.52	\$3,900.00	\$33.40	\$7,510.92
9	Vest-Corp Vest-Corp	7/31/85 8/31/85	\$7,510.92 \$12,166.86	\$4,600.00 \$2,400.00	\$55.94 \$67.10	\$12,1 66.86 \$14,633 .96
	Vest-Corp	9/30/85	\$14,633.96	\$5,800.00	\$21.50	\$20,455.46
10	Vest-Corp Vest-Corp	10/31/85 12/31/85	\$20,455.46 \$27,506.41	\$7,000.00 \$8,600.00	\$50.95 \$168.55	\$27,5 06.41 \$36,27 4.96
11	Vest-Corp	1/31/86	\$36,274.96	\$1,200.00	\$91.50	\$37,566.46
12	Vest-Corp	2/28/86 3/31/86	\$37,566.46 \$37,857.02	\$200.00 \$9,618.76	\$90.56 \$589.38	\$37,8 57.02 \$48,065 .16
12	Vest-Corp Vest-Corp	4/30/86	\$48,065.16	\$8,800.00	\$232.49	\$57,097.65
13	Vest-Corp	5/31/86	\$52,097.65	\$3,000.00 \$1,400.00	\$160.19 \$94.02	\$55,257.84 \$56,751.86
14	Vest-Corp Vest-Corp	6/30/86 7/31/86	\$55,257.84 \$50,751.86	\$225.00	\$ 74.00	\$51,050.86
	Vest-Corp	8/31/86	\$46,050.86	\$1,200.00 \$16,800.00	\$0.00 \$2.106.75	\$47,2 50.86
15	Vest-Corp	10/31/86	\$42,250.86	\$16,800.00	\$2,196.75	\$61,247.61
16	TOTALS			\$158,668.76	\$6,781.87	
17		PEN	ISION ASSET MAN	AGEMENT BII	LINGS	
18	Company	Billing Date	Amount Past Due	Monthly Fees	Monthly Costs	Amount Due
19				•	ous Balance Due)	-
20	PAM PAM	1/11/88 \$56,41 2/29/88 \$63,72				
20	PAM	3/31/88 \$65,40	2.18 \$6,00	0.00 \$672.5	0 \$ 72,07	4.68
21	PAM PAM	4/30/88 \$72,07 5/31/88 \$81,88				
22		5/51/60 \$61,60				
23	TOTALS			\$25,750.00	\$1,461.40	
23	34.	By Octobe	r 1988, defenda	nt Latham &	Watkins ha	ad been paid
24	\$208 000	00 for se	rvices rendere	d in conne	ction with	the BMF100
25						
26			to a letter from			
27	ч. -	_	defendant Stah			
28	-		or 1,000 hours o			
	in connec	ction with	the BMF100 of	ffering.]	In addition	n, defendant

Latham & Watkins provided legal services in connection with Cooper, Lindley and Jensen's attempt to organize a bank to act as the custodian for First Pension Individual Retirement Accounts.

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35. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the legal fees paid to defendant Latham & Watkins through VestCorp and/or PAM by came from fraudulently diverted funds from Receivership Entities. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Latham & Watkins knew or in the exercise of due care, should have known, of the diversions for the purpose of paying legal fees to the defendant Latham & Watkins.

10 36. In addition to the above described representations, defendant Latham & Watkins was involved in two other undertakings 11 12 from which they derived knowledge of the Cooper, Lindley, and 13 Jensen's unlawful conduct. By January 29, 1985, defendant Mendoza 14 was representing Jensen in connection with an SEC investigation into Vest-Corp of California and First Pension Corporation. 15 Plaintiff 16 is informed and believes that on January 31, 1985, SEC attorney 17 Claudia Grossfeld wrote defendant Mendoza a letter which provided 18 in pertinent part as follows:

This will confirm our telephone conversation of January 29, 1985, during which we scheduled Ms. Valerie Jensen's testimony for 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, February 5, 1985, at the Commission's Los Angeles Regional Office, 5757 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 500 East, Los Angeles, California 90036.

As we discussed, the primary purpose of Ms. Jensen's February 5 appearance will be to produce and authenticate certain of First Pension's records required by the Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to Ms. Jensen on December 10, 1984.

37. The January 31, 1985, letter went on to describe documents the SEC wanted produced for the period September 1980 to November 1984. The subject documents included First Pension's general journals, bank account documents, contracts, and loan documents.

1 38. Plaintiff is believes informed and that another 2 representation by Latham & Watkins involved a First Pension client, 3 Lucille Reynolds, a widow who had \$275,000 in an IRA Rollover 4 Account with First Pension. Ms. Reynolds was represented in 5 February 1987 by Thomas M. Gieser of the Swanson and Dowdall law 6 firm. On February 17, 1987, Mr. Gieser wrote defendant Mendoza a 7 letter which made no fewer than eight references to BMF1. The 8 letter provided in pertinent part:

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Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your letter dated February 11, 1987, which letter is in response (sic) to my previous letter to you dated February 9, 1987.

Unfortunately, your attempt to 'clarify several items' and to 'correct some inaccuracies' raises additional questions in my mind on behalf of my client.

- By way of background, I would advise you that my client, Mrs. Lucille Reynolds, a widow, has an IRA Rollover Account, #1-00622-40-001, with First Pension.
- In connection with said account, my client has had more than Two Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Dollars (\$275,000)
 deposited in the Bank Mortgage Fund No. 1.
- Approximately fifteen (15) months ago, Mrs. Reynolds advised First Pension, and Mr. Belka, of her desire to liquidate the funds from her IRA Rollover Account, specifically including the funds invested by First Pension with Bank Mortgage Fund No. 1.
- Although Mrs. Reynolds has received a distribution of a portion of her investment in this account, she has been advised repeatedly for the last approximately nine (9) months that the balance of her investment would not be distributed until the Bank Mortgage Fund No. 1 "went public."
- Specifically, when my client and I met with Mr. Belka on 24 September 16, 1986, he advised us that the total amount of investor funds in the Bank Mortgage Funds No. 1 was in 25 approximate amount the Ten of Million Dollars (\$10,000,000.00), and that Mrs. Reynolds' investment 26 balance of approximately Two Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars (\$240,000.00) amounted to approximately 2.4 27 percent of said total funds invested. During that meeting, Mr. Belka provided me with your name, and 28 suggested that I discuss with you the status of the qualification of the Bank Mortgage Fund. When I first

spoke with you on September 16, 1986, you advised me that you and/or your firm had been working on this for approximately one to one and one-half years, and that it was your estimate that by the end of October, 1986, at the latest, the Fund would be ready to "hit the street". (sic) You did advise me at that time that it was your estimate only that the client could start soliciting funds by the end of October.

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Thereafter, I spoke with you on February 9, 1987, and you advised me that it was your estimate that solicitation activities for new investors would be able to commence by the end of February, 1987. During both conversations, I was apparently operating under the mistaken belief that First Pension would be the entity soliciting funds. I certainly did not mean to misquote you in any way whatsoever.

 However, it appears from your letter dated February 11, 1987, that First Pension has no role whatsoever in the operating of the BMF Mortgage income Fund. As a matter of fact, I am not sure what connection, if any exists, between the Bank Mortgage Fund No. 1 that my client has invested in, and the BMF Mortgage income Fund that you are currently working on (emphasis added).

According to the representations of Glen Belka, my client 14 was led to believe that these funds were at the very 15 least extremely closely related, if not identical. As a matter of fact, my client has been advised by Mr. Belka, 16 as well as other representatives of First Pension, for the last several months, that as soon as the BMF Mortgage 17 Income Fund went public, she would be able to receive the balance of her investment in the Bank Mortgage Fund No. 18 1, in the approximate amount of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00). 19

However, after reviewing your letter, I am now not at all 20 sure that the completion of the public offering on the BMF Mortgage Income Fund will have any impact whatsoever 21 my client's ability to on receive liquidating a distribution from her Bank Mortgage Fund No. 1. In other 22 words, it appears that my client may have been "strung along" for several months by various representatives of 23 First pension, including Mr. Belka.

24 Would you please advise me, in writing, what the relationship is between the Bank Mortgage Fund No. 1, 25 currently administered by First Pension, and referred to in their statement as the "BMF Income Fund" and the BMF 26 Mortgage Income Fund that you are working on? In addition, would you please advise me, in writing, of the 27 impact of the BMF Mortgage Income Fund "going public" on my client's ability to receive a liquidating distribution 28 from Bank Mortgage Fund No. 1 referred to above. (This letter is referred to hereinafter as the "Reynolds

Letter").

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39. As a result of their distinguished backgrounds, training, 3 education, expertise, and involvement in the transactions and 4 undertakings described herein, defendants Stahr and Mendoza and 5 other personnel of Latham & Watkins, including C. Christopher Cox, 6 learned of material facts, including the diversion and commingling 7 of funds from Receivership Entities, which they either did not 8 disclose or misrepresented to the DOC, SEC and investors in 9 connection with the offering of the BMF100 public offering. 10 Defendants Stahr, Mendoza, Cox, and Latham & Watkins knew, 11 consciously avoided knowing or were reckless in not knowing of the 12 underlying scheme and other material facts which should have been 13 disclosed to investors, the DOC and the SEC, among others. 14 Defendants Latham & Watkins, Stahr, and Mendoza proceeded to join 15 in the scheme, failed to disclose or misrepresented facts to 16 investors, the DOC and SEC, which allowed the scheme to flourish. In addition, defendant Cox was also involved in making false representations to the DOC in connection with BMF100's application for qualification.

40. On December 4, 1984, defendant Mendoza forwarded by letter an Application for Qualification of Securities by Coordination in connection with a proposed initial public offering of Participation Interests in VestCorp Trust Deed Fund (this was the first name given Defendant Mendoza represented in his December 4, 1984, to BMF100). letter as follows:

It is presently contemplated that the participation interests will be offered initially to former investment advisory clients of Pension Asset Management, Inc., which corporation will serve as the Fund manager. These people have previously invested in trust deed loans (emphasis

added). The Fund is designed, in part, to give these people an opportunity to contribute <u>their trust deed</u> <u>loans</u> to the Fund, which will be composed of a number of trust deed loans, in exchange for Participation interests which will have approximately the same yield as <u>the trust</u> <u>deed loan contributed to the Fund</u>.

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41. This was false and misleading because existing investors had interests in BMF1, not individual trust deeds. They simply had no trust deed loans to contribute. This is established by the Information, the Reynolds Letter, and documents which defendant Mendoza had in his possession showing a complete listing of the existing trust deeds in the BMF1 and their financial status.

42. By letter to defendant Mendoza, Wallace Wong of the DOC responded on December 19, 1984, to defendant Mendoza's letter of December 4, 1984. Wallace Wong's letter provided in pertinent part:

The proposal to exchange participation interest for certain trust deed loans on the basis of the principal amount due without regard to any other terms or condition of payment history of such loan is inherently unfair. Such proposal results in a different price for each exchange. Such practice does not meet the requirements of Rule .50 and .51. Any such exchange should be based upon an independent appraisal or other appropriate determination of the value of each item of non-cash consideration at an appropriate point in time.

19 defendant Mendoza 1985, again 43. On January 11, misrepresented and omitted to state information needed to make that 20 which was stated not misleading, in a letter to the DOC addressed 21 22 to Wallace Wong. Defendant Mendoza represented that the "fund is being formed to permit holders of such small trust deed loans to 23 diversify their risk and to enhance the liquidity of their 24 Again this was not true since the investors held 25 investment." interests in BMF1, not individual trust deeds. Moreover, defendant 26 Mendoza made a series of misleading statements aimed at persuading 27 Wallace Wong that it was not necessary to review the value of the 28

trust deeds which were to be exchanged. In this regard defendant 1 Mendoza's letter provided that, "none of the loans included on 2 Schedule A has a delinguent payment history, each is current, and 3 each is adequately secured with respect to other encumbrances." 4 Defendant Mendoza left out the fact that several of the loans that 5 had a part of BMF1 had a delinquent payment history, were not 6 current, and were not adequately secured. Before the permit was 7 issued defendants Mendoza, Stahr, and Latham & Watkins had a list 8 of such loans in their files. 9

44. Defendant Mendoza, in his January 11, 1985, letter to
Wallace Wong, went to great lengths to persuade Wong that the trust
deeds did not need to be appraised by an independent appraiser.
Such an appraisal carried the very real risk that the underlying
scheme would be detected. The letter in this regard provided:

Given the inherently subjective techniques that would be employed to appraise each trust deed loan, and the absence of a secondary or other active market as a means to validate the appraisals, allocation of value according to the principal amount of trust deed loans contributed is the fairest means obtainable in the circumstances. In addition, the expense of such an evaluation would result in a substantial and unnecessary dilution of the investors' interests.

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45. This statement was misleading in view of the on-going dilution to investors interests caused by the underlying scheme. An independent valuation would have probably resulted in a detection of the underlying scheme and resulted in the independent appraiser disclosing that the trust deeds were not separate trust deeds but part of BMF1.

26 46. Defendant Mendoza's January 11, 1985, letter to Wallace
27 Wong contained other misleading statements. For example, on page
28 3 of the letter the following statement appears:

Although the Fund manager and Glen L. Belka meet the net worth requirement of Rule 111.2, the application of this Rule by analogy to the Fund is inappropriate. The purpose of the Rule is to provide a guarantee to investors in real estate programs (such as apartment building syndications) that the general partner, who is contracting with a variety of third parties for goods, materials and services will be in a position to meet such significant financial obligations. Rather, as virtually all of the Fund's assets will be held in relatively liquid financial instruments, the Fund manager's responsibilities are limited to acting as an investment adviser to the Fund, and providing reports and accounting information. These functions do not require substantial net worth.

47. This statement was misleading given the mounting short fall in BMF1, the fact that the Fund's assets were not to be held in liquid financial instruments, and the existing practices constituting the scheme. Under these premises a substantial net worth was required since a return to investors was very much dependent on the financial condition of the Fund Manager and defendant Belka.

48. Defendant Mendoza's January 11, 1985, letter is filled with other misleading statements. On page 4, defendant Mendoza again referenced existing investors exchanging "trust deed loans for an interest in the Fund." In fact, these investors did not have individual trust deed loans.

49. Defendant Latham & Watkins' attorney, C. Christopher Cox, went over Wallace Wong's head and attempted to use his influence with more senior officials at the DOC to circumvent the objections raised by Wallace Wong. By letter dated February 22, 1985, C. Christopher Cox made several misrepresentations and misleading statements to DOC personnel, Morton L. Riff, Ernest W. Kapes and Wallace Wong. Attorney Cox wrote in pertinent part:

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Each loan selected by Fund Manager: All investors-- those who have invested in the trust deeds listed on Schedule A, and those who have not yet but will invest in the Fund are cash investors. At the time of their investment, their monies have been or will be promptly invested in a trust deed loan with a principal balance equal to the amount of their investments. [Emphasis added]

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50. This is a direct misrepresentation. Existing investors funds were not promptly invested in trust deed loans at the time of their investment. Further, there were not individual trust deeds, but rather a pool of trust deeds in which interests had been sold. The interests sold to investors materially exceeded the trust deeds that had been purchased.

51. Defendant Cox also made additional misleading and materially deficient statements in attempting to persuade the DOC to forego the requirement that the existing trust deeds be independently valued. Defendant Cox stated as follows on page 6 of his February 22, 1985, letter:

> 4. Imprudent use of investors' funds: Given the subjectivity of any "appraisal" in the absence of an secondary market of substantial depth, active expenditure of Fund assets for such an "appraisal" would unfairly and unreasonably harm the investors' rate of return. By significantly increasing frontend costs, it could also render the organization of Fund uneconomical, thereby eliminating the an opportunity for the Schedule A investors to diversify their investment risk.

52. In addition to being misleading, this statement was manipulative in that it attempted to mischaracterize the usefulness of an expenditure of funds for an appraisal that had a high probability of uncovering the scheme as anti-investor. Defendant Cox also states on page 8 of his February 22, 1985, letter that:

(c) <u>No unusual risk</u>: Because all the trust deed loans are secured and overcollateralized there is relatively low risk. The Fund, moreover, will be diversified. Therefore, an investor who owns a single trust deed loan will be

acquiring a <u>less</u> risky investment than the one he already owns.

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53. This statement was false in that it concealed that the trust deed loans were not secured and were under-collateralized. This was a highly risky investment, and there were no single trust deed loans held by investors. Those interests had been pooled into BMF1.

> (d) Not a complex investment: Investment in the Fund is straightforward. The Fund is a mutual fund which will own a single kind of fixed-income asset, and such assets will be fully secured. Since the Fund is styled as a mutual fund, it is easy to understand for the average investor.

54. This was also misleading since the investment being described to the DOC was not the investment investors had, BMF1, or Defendant Cox also told the DOC in his were to buy, BMF100. February 22, 1985, letter that the investment was designed for the small investor, and was designed to permit the small investor to realize the benefits of diversification. In fact, the investment was designed to hide the existing scheme which had resulted in substantially undisclosed losses for existing investors. Further, C. Christopher Cox, again on page 9 of his letter, suggested that existing investors were invested in single trust deeds ("When a single trust deed loan turns sour without warning, an investor might lose everything."). These same misleading statements to the effect that there were individual trust deeds were made to DOC personnel in private phone conversations and personal meetings by both C. Christopher Cox and defendant Mendoza.

55. Defendant Mendoza, with the active involvement of defendant Cox, continued to make the foregoing misleading statements and misrepresentations to the DOC to the effect that existing

1 investors were invested in individual trust deeds. The foregoing misleading statements and misrepresentations were made in letters 2 3 sent to the DOC on May 14, 1985 (signed by defendant Mendoza), May 4 20, 1985 (signed by defendant Mendoza), June 26, 1987 (signed by defendant Mendoza), July 30, 1987 (signed by defendant Mendoza), and 5 6 August 30, 1987 (signed by defendant Mendoza). Defendant Mendoza also made similar misleading statements in three letters written to 7 the SEC on September 24, 1986, February 12, 1987, and April 2, 1987. 8

9 56. The prospectus used to sell BMF100, which was drafted by 10 defendant Latham & Watkins, also misstated the status of pre-11 existing investors. On page 4 the prospectus provided that "Up to 12 \$2,164,000 of the Trust Deed Loans comprising the Fund may be 13 contributed by PAM's former investment advisory clients in exchange 14 for Participation Interests." This statement was misleading to both 15 existing investors and future investors, in that it did not disclose the relationship between BMF1 and BMF100. The prospectus contains 16 17 numerous instances of similar materially misleading statements at pages 5, 9, 17, 18, 19, 20, and Schedule A, for example. 18

19 57. In addition to the foregoing, there were omissions of
20 material facts in the prospectus. These omissions included:

a. the fact that the BMF1 trust deeds had been pooled,
and as a result of the pooling, BMF1 was in violation of the
qualification provisions of the California securities laws;

b. the true financial condition of BMF1, which in fact,
had a material shortfall of funds;

26 c. prior investigations into First Pension Corporation
27 and Vestcorp by the SEC;

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d. Ms. Lucille Reynold's letter and claim regarding her

1 request for a liquidation distribution of her investment in BMF1; 2 and

e. the fact that various trust deeds reviewed by defendant Latham and Watkins were in fact non-performing trust deeds.

Defendant Mendoza made the misleading statements and 6 58. 7 engaged in the unlawful conduct complained of, and acted under the 8 direct supervision of defendant Stahr. On a date in 1986 or 1987, 9 unknown to plaintiffs, attorney C. Christopher Cox left the firm of 10 defendant Latham & Watkins. In the beginning of 1988, defendant Mendoza left the firm of defendant Latham & Watkins. 11 Defendant 12 Mendoza however continued to provide legal services to Cooper, 13 Jensen, and Lindley from 1992 to July 1993 while employed with a different law firm. Defendant Mendoza, after becoming the 14 15 Commissioner of the California Department of Corporations, continued 16 to have business contact with defendant Cooper including an effort to collect a delinquent bill owed to defendant Mendoza's former law 17 18 firm.

> First Claim for Relief Fraud and Deceit

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(Against All Defendants)

59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint as though fully set forth. 60. Plaintiff is proceeding in this First Claim for Relief for conduct prior to and during the offer and sale of said limited partnership units and for conduct subsequent to the initial offer. The Defendants owed to Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities a statutory and common law duty of care to disclose truthfully all

1 necessary and relevant facts.

61. The fraud herein alleged occurred in two forms. The first
consisted of deceitful omissions in connection with the offer and
sale of the limited partnership units.

5 62. The second form of fraud consisted of the defendants' 6 failure to disclose facts concerning the true nature of the limited 7 partnership units sold by Defendants. As described above, the 8 Defendants continued their concealment and subsequent wrongdoing in 9 connection with the limited partnership units.

10 63. Defendants acted knowingly and intentionally in doing the
11 things alleged herein above. The Defendants knew that material
12 facts were being suppressed and, despite duties to reveal same,
13 concealed material facts with the intent to deceive.

64. Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities justifiably and
reasonably relied upon the defendants' flawed disclosure of material
facts.

17 65. As a direct and legal result of the acts and conduct of 18 the Defendants as herein alleged, Plaintiff has been damaged in an 19 amount to be determined according to proof at trial, but not less 20 than all sum paid to defendants, together with interest thereon as 21 provided by law.

66. The acts complained of against the Defendants were committed with fraudulent and malicious intent to injure without concern for the rights of Plaintiff. The conduct of the Defendants was ratified by each and every Defendant named in this first claim for relief, for which exemplary and punitive damages should be awarded in a sum according to proof at trial.

Second Claim for Relief Breach of Fiduciary Duty

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(Against All Defendants)

67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 66 of this Complaint as though fully set out.
68. The Defendants acting as attorneys breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities.
Defendants knowingly participated in such breaches.

69. The duties expressly assumed by the Defendants and owed to the Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities include, inter alia:

- a. The duty to act with reasonable care to ascertain that the information set forth in the offering materials, documents and oral presentations was accurate and did not contain misleading statements or omissions of material facts.
 - b. The duty to deal fairly and honestly with Receivership Entities.
 - c. The duty to avoid placing itself, himself or themselves in situations involving a conflict of interest with Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities.
 - d. With respect to the these Defendants, all fiduciary duties undertaken by officers and directors under corporate law and partnership law.

70. The Defendants failed to fulfill their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and Receivership Entities in the following respects:

> Failing to act with reasonable care to ensure that the information set forth in the offering materials,

documents and oral presentations communicated was accurate and did not contain misleading or fraudulent statements or omissions of material facts.

 Engaging in transactions which resulted in a conflict of interest.

c. Failing to adequately and fully disclose the full extent and nature of the conflicts of interest in which the Defendants, and their affiliates would be engaging.

d. Preferring Defendants' own interests and those of their affiliates over those of the Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities.

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- e. Profiting and allowing Defendants' affiliates to profit at the expense of Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities.
 - f. Engaging in transactions which were designed to and did result in a profit to the Defendants and their affiliates at the expense of Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities.

21 71. Defendants knowingly induced or participated in each
22 others' breach of fiduciary duties as previously alleged herein.

72. The acts of the Defendants in breaching, or knowingly
inducing or participating in the breach of fiduciary duties show a
willful indifference to the rights of Plaintiff and the Receivership
Entities.

27 73. As a proximate result of the Defendants' breach of their
28 fiduciary duties, and Defendants' knowing inducement or

1 participation therein, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount 2 to be determined at trial, but not less than all sums paid to 3 defendants.

74. The Defendants' acts were outrageous and were perpetrated with an evil mind requiring an award of punitive damages sufficient to deter Defendants and others from fraudulent conduct in the future.

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Third Claim for Relief Aiding and Abetting Breaches of Fiduciary Duties

(Against All Defendants)

75. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference
paragraphs 1 through 74 of this Complaint as though fully set forth
herein.

14 76. Defendants participated in and aided and abetted each
15 other in knowingly breaching fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and
16 the Receivership Entities.

17 77. Defendants, and each of them, were aware of the fiduciary 18 relationships described above and the resultant duties owed to 19 Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities. With full knowledge of 20 these duties, Defendants, and each of them, materially aided and 21 abetted in breaching the fiduciary duties of others by acting as set 22 forth above.

78. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiff has suffered general and specific damages, but not less than all sums paid to defendants, with interest thereon, to be determined according to proof at trial.

Fourth Claim for Relief Negligent Omissions

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(Against All Defendants)

79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference
paragraphs 1 through 78 of this Complaint as though fully set forth
herein.

80. Defendants owed Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities
an affirmative duty to act with reasonable diligence to ascertain
the true state of affairs and to disclose all necessary and relevant
facts to Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities.

11 81. The omissions alleged above were made by Defendants, 12 directly or indirectly, negligently and carelessly, without any 13 reasonable grounds for asserting them. Defendants knew, or should 14 have known, of the true facts and that the representations made to 15 Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities were false. Consequently, 16 Defendants' conduct constituted a breach of duty and constructive 17 fraud.

18 82. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' 19 negligence, Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities have been 20 damaged in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial, 21 but not less than all sums paid to defendants, together with 22 interest thereon as provided by law.

Fifth Claim for Relief Negligent Misrepresentations

(Against All Defendants)

27 83. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference and
28 reallege paragraphs 1 through 82 of this Complaint as though set

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forth fully herein.

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As more fully set forth above, Defendants had an 2 84. affirmative duty to act with reasonable diligence toward Plaintiff 3 and the Receivership Entities. Misrepresentations were made by each 4 Defendant negligently or in reckless disregard for the truth 5 These misrepresentations were made by each Defendant and 6 thereof. with the express intent and actual knowledge that Plaintiff and the 7 Receivership Entities would rely upon them. 8

9 85. At the time these misrepresentations were made, Plaintiff 10 and the Receivership Entities were ignorant of their falsity and 11 believed them to be true.

86. Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities relied upon the misrepresentations and omissions of the Defendants, and each of them. As a direct, proximate and reasonably foreseeable result of the foregoing conduct, Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities members have suffered damages with interest thereon, to be determined according to proof at trial, but not less than all sums paid to defendants.

Sixth Claim for Relief Negligence

(Against All Defendants)

87. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference
paragraphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint as though set forth fully
herein.

26 88. The Defendants owed Plaintiff and the Receivership 27 Entities the duty to act with reasonable care in complying with the 28 law, to inform them truthfully and fully about the said limited

partnership formation, offerings, and sales, and to exercise reasonable care in the operation and management of the partnerships.

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89. As set forth above, Defendants breached these duties.

90. The breach of these duties was the proximate cause of
damages to Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities.

91. The Defendants' conduct, described above, was reckless,
willful, wanton, outrageous and perpetrated with an evil mind, so
as to require an award of punitive damages sufficient to deter
Defendants and others from similar conduct in the future.

Seventh Claim for Relief Professional Malpractice

(Against All Defendants)

92. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference and
realleges paragraphs 1 through 91 as though set forth fully
herein. The claims asserted herein arise out of the same nucleus
of operative facts as those alleged under the preceding Causes of
Action.

93. Plaintiff proceeds with this claim for professional
malpractice against the Attorney Defendants who provided legal
services to BMF100.

94. The Attorney Defendants, in the course and scope of their agency, advised and rendered legal services to Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities, which fell below the standard of care and violated the standard of conduct to be adhered to by lawyers practicing in similar situations.

27 95. These Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff and the
28 Receivership Entities, to render competent legal advice and legal

services with such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of their profession commonly possess and exercise and not to render such advice or services recklessly or negligently. The Attorney Defendants were reckless or negligent in rendering their services and such services fell below the standard of care to be adhered to by lawyers practicing in similar situations.

7 96. The Attorney Defendants owed Plaintiffs and the Class 8 professional and fiduciary duties to perform their work honestly 9 and with due care under community standards. These Attorney 10 Defendants breached these duties to Plaintiff and the 11 Receivership Entities. Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities, 12 at the time of the breaches of duties, were ignorant of the 13 breaches and of the falsity of the statements made. In reliance upon said legal services, Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities 14 15 were misled. Had Plaintiff and the Receivership Entities known 16 the true facts and the breaches of duties they would not have 17 continued and/or would have taken action to reduce their losses.

97. As a direct and legal result of the Attorney Defendants
breaches of professional duties, Plaintiff and the Receivership
Entities have been damaged in an amount to be determined
according to proof at trial, but not less than all sums paid to
defendants, together with interest thereon as provided by law.

PRAYER

25 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants, 26 and each of them as follows:

27 UPON THE FIRST AND SECOND CLAIMS FOR RELIEF:

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For damages in an amount not less than \$5,000,000., or an

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1	amount according to proof at Trial;
2	For all sums paid to defendants;
3	For Punitive Damages; and
4	For Prejudgment Interest at the Statutory Rate of 10%.
5	UPON THE THIRD THROUGH SEVENTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF:
6	For damages in an amount not less than \$5,000,000., or an
7	amount according to proof at Trial; and
8	For Prejudgment Interest at the Statutory Rate of 10%.
9	UPON ALL CAUSES OF ACTION:
10	For All Other Relief the Court Deems Just and Proper.
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12	JACOBS & ROACH A Professional Law Corporation
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14	Dated: June 14 1995 By: Man low
15	Gary Byron Roach, Attorneys for Plaintiff, Donald W. Henry,
16	Receiver
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HORT CASE TITLE		NIA, COUNTY SA LOS A	INGELES	
Henry v. Latham & Watkins, et al.		CERTIFICATE OF ASSIGNMENT		
File this certificate w	ith all cases presented for filin	ig in all districts of the Los Angel	les Superior Court.	
the Los Angeles Superior C checked balow. The addres		Civil Procedure and Rule 300, Sections 3 and tention, place of business, or other factor white		
NAME (INDICATE BITLE OF OTT GACY BLY VEN-HURA	IER QUALIFYING FACTOR) CON ROACH (STATE) CA 93035	NOOHESA: 1280 S. VIC. Ste 250 Ventura, CA		
		ED FOR TRIAL 10 HOURS / CA	DAYS.	
		NATURE OF ACTION.		
NATURE OF ACTION	GROUND	NATURE OF ACTION	GROUND	
 A7100 Vehicle Accident A7210 Med Malpractice A7200 Other Personal Inj. A7220 Product Liability A6050 Other Malpractice A6012 Collection/Note A6040 Injunct Relief A6030 Declar Relief 	The cause of action arose within the district. One or more defendants resides within the district. or Rule 300 allows filing in Central District (non-torts only).	 A5520 Regular Dissolution A5525 Summary Dissolution A5530 Nullity A5510 Legal Separation A6135 Foreign Support A6136 Foreign Custody A6122 Domestic Violence A6130 Family Law Complaint-Other 	One or more of the party litigants resides within the district. (Not a requirement for filling in Contral District- Rule 300)	
AG170 Late Claim Relief AG000 Other Compit. (Specify):	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	A6132 Paternity	Child resides or deceased father's probate would be filed in the district.	
A6011 Contract	Performance in the district is expressly provided for	A6101 Agency Adoption A6102 Independent Adoption A6102 Independent Adoption A6104 Stepparent Adoption A6103 Adult Adoption A6106 Sole Custody Petition	Petitioner resides within the district. Consent to out-of-state adoption, consentor resides within the district.	
A6140 Admin Award	The administrative tribunal is located within the district	A6105 Abandonment A6210 Probate Will-otters Testamentary A6211 Probate Will-otters Administration	Decedent resided within the district	
A6160 Abstract A6141 Sister State Judgment A7221 Asbestosis A6134 R.E.S.L.	The Judgment debtor holds property within the district	A6211 Probate view Ducts Administration A6212 Letters of Administration A6213 Letters of Special Administration A6215 Spousal Property A6216 Succession to Real Property A6217 Summary Probate	Decedent resided out of the district, but held property within the district. or	
A6111 Minor's Contract	·	A6218 Small Estate (13200 PC) A6230 Conservatorship P & E	Petitioner, conservatee or ward resides within this	
A6110 Name Change A6121 Civil Harassment A6100 Other Petition Specify):	One or more of the party litigents resides within the district.	A6231 Conservatorship Person A6232 Conservatorship Estate A6233 Medical Treatment without Consent A6240 Guardianship P & E A6241 Guardianship Person	district.	
A6151 Mandamus* A6152 Prohibition* A6150 Other Writ* Specify)	The defendant functions wholly within the district.	 A6242 Guardianship Estate A6243 Spouse Lacks Capacity A6254 Trust Proceedings A6200 Probate Other (Specify): 		
A6600 H.C. Family Law	Child is held within the District	Cal A6260 Comp Minor's Claim		
of California that the foregoin	jury under the laws of the State ng is true and correct and this 1 <u>JUNU 14, 1995</u> 1 California.	**On Righe 300 attows optional filing in		

* Perogative writs concerning a court of inferior jurisdiction shall be filed in Central District.

THE COURT MAY IMPOSE SANCTIONS OR OTHER PENALITIES FOR FAILURE TO FILE IN THE PROPER DISTRICT.

4 70C134 BC 018/12-92

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CERTIFICATE OF ASSIGNMENT

RULE 300 LASCR